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This paper attempts to provide experimental evidence on fire prevention and risk aversion 
among urban informal settlers using lottery choice data with real monetary prizes. The paper 
estimates the risk attitudes of a sample of 174 individuals from an informal housing 
development in Cape Town. The empirical analysis is performed within the expected utility 
theory specification, assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) defined over the lottery 
prize. We tests the hypothesis that risk averse individuals will take precautionary measures in 
as far as possible to mitigate the risk of fire to their household. We find that individual-level 
fire prevention measures that are within the means of the households to effect, such as making 
sure that matches, lighters and paraffin are kept out of reach of children, is correlated with 
risk aversion, but measures, such as building of homes at least 3-5 meters from the 
neighbours, does not seem to be within the choice set of low-income informal dwellers. Our 
results further indicate that subjects who engage in fire prevention/fire safety strategies that 
require the “most effort” (that are most effective and costly) are significantly more risk 
averse relative to subjects engaging in fire safety measures that need “least effort”. Contrary 
to expectation, distance from the main road, informal electricity connection, and the use of 
paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking are not correlated with risk aversion, indicating 
that irrespective of the risk profiles of decision makers, low-income households are often 
forced to make choices that increase their exposure to fire hazards.   
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With the growing urban informal settlements in Africa in general and South Africa in 
particular, the problems and challenges of fire have persisted annually, which have become a 
disaster, in many of these settlements. Informal settlements are often characterised by both 
poor infrastructure and high population growth, mainly due to urbanisation. These factors 
coupled with poverty and inequality in informal settlements is related to sprawling informal 
settlements which increases the occurrence of fires. Fires in the informal settlements in Cape 
Town are a particular problem. They destroy dwellings almost on a weekly basis, 
undermining fragile livelihoods and compounding the conditions of extreme vulnerability of 
poor households (Pharoah, 2009). Recent statistics shows that over 17,354 fire incidents 
occurred between 1999 and 2012 in informal settlements in Cape Town1 although the number 
of structures affected has reduced2 from 8,864 in 2003, 3,700 in 2009 to 1586 in 2013 (CCT, 
2013).  
 
There are several structural features of informal settlements that increase the spread and 
severity of fires. Many informal settlements in Cape Town, such as Sweet Home Farm in 
Philippi, Masphumelele and Imizamo Yethu, are very high density settlements with dwellings 
constructed with materials that are cheap but rather highly flammable, including plastics, 
untreated wood and cardboard. The high density nature of informal settlements make it easy 
for fire to spread between dwellings and difficult for emergency and rescue services to reach 
affected areas – a situation that is often compounded by a lack of hood extinguishing systems, 
portable fire extinguishers, home fire sprinklers and water mains. In addition, the spaces 
between dwellings are narrow and often congested with potential fuel, from flammable 
household waste to disused cars (Pharoah, 2009). As most people in informal settlements 
often uses open fires, such as paraffin/candles/fires, as the main source of lighting, heating 
and cooking, and many are perpetrators of illegal/informal electricity connection or 
“electricity tapping”, the risk of fire is extremely high in these settlements.   
 
Research in several different informal settlements suggest that fires are often linked to 
behavioural factors such as alcohol abuse, smoking and domestic violence. For instance, 
                                                             
1 See Figure A.I in the appendix for a trend in fire incidents in informal settlements for the period 1999 to 2012 
in Cape Town.  
2 See Figure A.II in the appendix for a trend in the number of structures affected by fire from 2005 to 2013 in 
informal settlement in Cape Town 
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Pharoah (2009) notes that in Imizamo Yethu, Cape Town residents report that fires are 
commonly started when people return from a night of drinking in local “shebeens”3 and 
either fall asleep with candles or stoves burning or knock them over. Such behaviour is 
reported to be common among young men living alone, which tend to suggest that both the 
number of drinking establishments and the demographic profile of settlements may influence 
fire risk (MacGregor et al, 2005; Morrissey & Taylor, 2006).  
In many localities, the local authorities are the custodian of fire fighting services within their 
jurisdiction. They are usually charged with the responsibility of planning, co-ordinating and 
regulating of fire services. In Cape Town, the City of Cape Town (CCT) has continued 
providing fire fighting services within its jurisdiction. However, just like other local 
authorities in the country, they are faced with operational challenges in fire fighting especially 
in the growing urban informal settlements. Many of the fire risk management techniques 
implemented by the authorities of the City of Cape Town are seen in formally planned 
settlements. For instance, the City of Cape Town recommends keeping a well-maintained fire 
extinguisher at home, and knowing how to use it, but this is seldom the case in informal 
settlements. As such, when fires occur, whole areas (and large numbers of people) are 
affected by fire. Damages include loss of property/possessions and often lives. It is unknown 
how many people are killed and injured by informal settlement fires, but it is clear that they 
cause significant damage to and loss of property and assets, placing strain on both 
communities and local authorities (See for example Figure I).  
 
Fires in informal settlements are closely associated to socio-economic conditions. It has been 
suggested by many development practitioners that a solution to fire problems exist in 
upgrading of these urban informal settlements through proper housing. The South African 
government has struggled to keep up with the demand for low-income housing and in cities 
like Cape Town, many people live in informal settlements for years while they wait for 
government housing (IRIN News, 2013). Sadly, there is substantial evidence that suggest that 
some fires are started deliberately in an attempt to jump the queue for government-subsidized 
low-cost housing (e.g. DiMP, 2002; MacGregor et al, 2005; Morrissey & Taylor, 2006). In 
the BM Section in Khayelitsha, Cape Town (the area where this risk experiment was 
conducted), fire has highlighted the need for a more holistic approach to the prevention of 
                                                             
3 These are places in informal settlements where food, tobacco, beer and other alcoholic beverages are sold i.e. 
shebeens are local pubs/bars/clubs in informal settlements where excisable alcoholic beverages are sold usually 
without a licence.  
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fires that includes better planning of informal settlements and enforcement of legislation that 
prohibits the so-called land invasions, particularly in high fire-risk areas (IRIN News, 2013).  
 
 
Figure I: Destruction of Fire in Langa Zone 17, 19 & 20, Cape Town on Monday 05 March 
2012 (Source: City of Cape Town, 2013) 
 
There is an extensive literature on fire and fire prevention. However, existing literature has 
treated the subject from the viewpoint of those who through practicable means seek to reduce 
fire hazards; broadly examining the origin and/or causes of fire, its control and prevention 
measures4. This paper does not however explicitly focus itself on fire and fire prevention but 
rather relates risk preferences to fire prevention measures among urban informal settlers. We 
attempt to provide experimental evidence on fire prevention and risk aversion among informal 
urban dwellers using a field experiment that uses real monetary incentives.  
Existing literature on behavioural and experimental economics tends to shows that risk 
attitudes play a role in decision making across a number of contexts – for example, the 
adoption of new farming practices (e.g. Binswanger, 1980; Feder, Gerston, Just & Zilberman, 
1985; Hodgdon, 1966), compliance with fishing regulation (e.g. Brick, Visser & Burns, 2012; 
Eggert & Lokina, 2007), and flood mitigation (e.g. Brick & Visser, forthcoming). This study 
                                                             
4See for example Crosby, 1905; Bayliss, 1955 for a comprehensive review of fire and fire prevention. 
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contributes to this discussion by illustrating that risk preferences matter in the case of reducing 
the risk of fires.  More so, these studies are showing that risk attitudes can affect decision 
making even when large stakes are involved (in this case, individuals have a lot to lose in the 
advent of a fire – so the financial stakes are high).   
Indeed, risk attitudes play a role in subjects’ use of fire safety measures and as such one would 
expect a priori that many subjects would be risk averse. Specifically, as subjects, who 
participated in this field experiment, live in the same area and face largely the same 
probability of fire, risk preferences (along with socio-demographic characteristics that can be 
controlled for) likely explain heterogeneity in putting into practice fire safety measures by 
residents. To this effect, we tests the hypothesis that risk averse individuals will take 
precautionary measures in as far as possible to mitigate the risk of fire to their household. We 
present estimates of individual risk attitudes within an expected utility theory (EUT) 
framework that incorporates real monetary incentives, socio-demographic characteristics and 
subjects’ use of fire safety measures.  
There is an extensive literature on behavioural and experimental economics in development 
that utilizes the expected utility theory framework to investigate development problems (e.g. 
Hey & Orme, 1994; Holt & Laury, 2002; Harrison, Lau & Ruström, 2007; Schechter, 2007). 
The expected utility theory is a very powerful tool for the analysis of decisions under risk 
(Quiggin, 1982) and it has widely been utilized in both developed and developing countries 
(e.g. Harrison, Lau and Ruström (2007) in Denmark; Holt and Laury (2002) in the United 
States; Brick, Visser and Burns (2012) in South Africa, Binswanger (1980) in India, Galarza 
(2009) in Peru). The expected utility framework has been used to analyse decision-making 
under uncertainty in a variety of contexts, namely: the role of risk aversion as a possible 
behavioral explanation for the lack of technology adoption among the rural poor (e.g. 
Harrison, Humphrey & Verschoor, 2010), compliance with fishing regulation (e.g. Brick, 
Visser & Burns, 2012) and the slow down in the adoption of financial or production 
innovations (e.g. Feder, 1980; Feder, Gerston, Just, & Zilberman, 1985). 
There are however other competing theories of choice under uncertainity that have been 
extensively used in both empirical and theoretical studies. Prospect theory (PT) and its 
counterpart Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) are leading alternative theories to expected 
utility theory. In this context, several studies have found subjects’ observed behaviour to be 
inconsistent with expected utility theory (e.g. Tversky & Kahneman 1992, Camerer 1998, 
Humphrey & Verschoor 2004, Mosley & Verschoor 2005) while other studies find evidence 
12 
 
of heterogeneity in decision making – where subjects’ choices are not best represented in one 
single theory (e.g. Harrison & Rutstrom 2009, Harrison, Humphrey, & Verschoor, 2010). 
Nothwithstanding this fact, expected utility theory (EUT) remains one of the leading theories  
of choice under uncertainty (mainly due to the advantage it has on parameterization over other 
theories)5. This paper estimates individuals’ risk attitudes using the expected utility theory 
(EUT) framework, assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). The objective of this 
study is not to evaluate different theories of choice under uncertainty, but rather to examine 
how risk preferences are related to subjects’ engagement in fire prevention strategies in 
informal settlements.  
This paper contributes to the growing literature on risk aversion6 and its applications in 
development and is closely related to a number of recent studies on the subject. Important 
contributions include Harrison, Lau and Ruström (2007), who estimate individual risk 
attitudes using controlled experiments in the field in Denmark on a sample of 253 people aged 
between 19 and 75 years of age. This study reported that the average Dane is risk averse and 
that risk attitudes vary significantly with respect to several important socio-demographic 
variables such as age and education. Using lottery choice data from a field experiment, 
Binswanger (1980) concluded that most farmers in India exhibit a significant amount of risk 
aversion that tends to increase as payoffs are increased. Related to this finding, Brick, Visser 
and Burns (2012), using subjects’ choices over lotteries with real monetary prizes estimated 
the risk attitudes of a large sample of small-scale fishers from various fishing communities 
along the west coast of South Africa. This study found that participants exhibited moderate 
risk aversion and that risk attitudes vary with certain socio-demographic variables, that is, 
females were found to be more risk averse than their male counterparts (Brick, Visser & 
Burns, 2012). (See, Table A.III in the appendix for a summary of selected previous related 
studies). All these and similar studies presents mounting evidence that suggests variation in 
                                                             
5The essence of the expected utility theory (EUT) is to determine a single parameter for assessing risk 
preferences e.g. in constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) terms, a single parameter,  , is analysed to determine 
the risk preference of subjects while other theories e.g. the cumulative prospect theory involve estimating more 
than a single parameter. 
6 The notion of risk aversion, from an empirical analysis perspective, is equivalent to concavity of the utility 
function under the expected utility theory and thus one would expect that one utility function is “more risk 
averse” than another if it is “more concave”. In empirical studies, risk aversion has been inferred from auctioning 
i.e. bidding and pricing tasks (e.g. Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992); field and laboratory experiments (e.g. Brick, 
Visser & Burns, 2012; Harrison & Ruström 2008; Harrison, Lau & Ruström, 2007; Hey & Orme, 1994; 
Binswanger, 1980); in buying and/or selling prices for simple lotteries (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002);  and 
behavioural decision-making (e.g. Maguire & Albright, 2005).  
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risk attitudes across several identifiable socio-demographic and individual characteristics of 
the samples under investigation. 
 
The experimental design and procedure employed in this study is a replication of Harrison 
and Rutström (2009, 2008), and Hey and Orme (1994), with extensions to collect socio-
demographic characteristics and subjects’ fire experience and fire safety measures data. 
Following Hey and Orme (1994), subjects were asked to make choices over 60 pair of lottery 
tasks. A total of 174 subjects were recruited from BM section in Khayelitsha, Cape Town. We 
tests the hypothesis that risk averse individuals will take precautionary measures in as far as 
possible to mitigate the risk of fire to their household. We finds that individual-level fire 
prevention measures that are within the means of the households to effect, such as making 
sure that matches, lighters and paraffin are kept out of reach of children, is correlated with 
risk aversion, but measures, such as building of homes at least 3-5 meters from the 
neighbours, does not seem to be within the choice set of low-income informal dwellers7. We 
also grouped the fire prevention measures into two (2) broad categories, namely “most effort” 
and “least effort” measures depending on the effort and cost involved in each measure and 
constructed a binary variable that captures households engaging in these measures. Our results 
indicate that subjects who engage in fire prevention/fire safety strategies that require the „most 
effort‟ (that are most effective and costly) are significantly more risk averse relative to 
subjects engaging in fire safety measures that need „least effort‟. In terms of demographic 
variables, there is a significant effect from age, with risk aversion increasing with each year in 
age of subjects.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, the choice under uncertainty 
structural model i.e. the expected utility theory specification is discussed while Section III 
summarizes the experiment design and procedures, with additional details provided in Brick 
and Visser (forthcoming) that share the dataset with the current study. Section IV details the 
specifics of the sample. In Section V, the paper examines the results and relates them to those 
found in similar previous studies. Section VI summarizes the main findings of the paper and 
makes concluding remarks.  
 
                                                             
7 The fire prevention strategies investigated in this paper are some of the low-cost individual and local initiatives 
fire safety measures that the local authorities of the City of Cape Town have recommended. See more on: 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/en/FireAndRescue/Pages/PreventingFires.aspx and in the next section, where we 
give a detailed account of these fire safety measures.    
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II. CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY: EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY  
In this section, we will describe the estimation procedure used to measure risk preferences, 
assuming that the data are entirely generated by the Expected Utility Theory (EUT) following 
Harrison and Rutström (2008) and Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010), with 
additional references indicated in text. 
Expected Utility Theory (EUT) 
The experiment estimation procedure used in this paper assumes a latent structural model 
under Expected Utility Theory (EUT). EUT is a very powerful and convenient way to 
represent people’s attitudes toward risk. The essence of the EUT approach is that the utility, 
 ( ) of some lottery, say L, can be represented as the probability-weighted average of the 
utilities of the outcomes associated with L (Jehle & Reny, 2011).  
For exposition, assuming that the utility of income is defined by Constant Relative Risk 
Aversion (CRRA) as: 
 ( )  
(   )(   )
(   )
         (1) 
where   is the lottery prize,   is the endowment, and    (for    )8 is a parameter to be 
estimated. The CRRA specification entails that when     (i.e. zero) it implies risk 
neutrality,     (i.e. positive) indicates risk aversion and     (i.e. negative) indicates risk 
seeking. For   possible outcomes in a lottery, under EUT, the probabilities for each outcome 
 , denoted as   , are those that are induced by the experimenter. Thus, the expected utility is 
simply the probability weighted utility of each outcome in each lottery  : 
    ∑ (     )
 
     for           ;         9   (2) 
The EU for each lottery pair is calculated for a candidate estimate of   , and the index 
                    (3) 
                                                             
8 Harrison and Rutström (2008) note that for     assume  ( )     ( ) if needed. 
9 Although in this experiment, the loss frame (treatment) had          as 6 subjects do not show up on the 
actual day of the experiment. 
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calculated, where      is the “left” lottery and     is the “right” lottery. This latent index, 
based on latent preferences, is then linked to the observed choices using a cumulative normal 
distribution function (   )10. This “probit” function takes any arguments between    and 
transforms it into a number between 0 and 1. The agent chooses lottery R if        , 
where   is a normally distributed error term with mean zero and variance,    (i.e. the 
conventional interpretation of   is the sampling error). Thus, the probit link function, 
showing the probability that R is chosen, is: 
  (                )    (       )    (  ⁄  
    
 ⁄ )   (
   
 ⁄ ) (4) 
Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010) notes that the cumulative normal distribution 
function  ( ) forms the critical statistical link between observed binary choices, the latent 
structure generating the index   , and the probability of that index    being observed. In this 
application,    refers to some function, such as equation (3), of the EU of two lotteries. The 
index defined by equation (3) is linked to the observed choices by specifying that the R 
lottery is chosen when        , which is implied by equation (4). 
Thus the likelihood of the observed responses, conditional on the EUT and CRRA 
specifications being true, depends on the estimates of    given the above statistical 
specification and the observed choices. The “statistical specification” usually assumes some 
functional form for the cumulative density function (cdf), such as the normal distribution 
function11. Ignoring responses that reflect indifference, Anderson, Harrison, Lau and 
Rutström (2010) notes that the conditional log-likelihood function would be 
    (     )  ∑ *(   (   )   (    ))  (  (   (   ))   (     ))+  (5) 
where  ( ) is the indicator function,     (     ) denotes the choice of the option R(L) 
lottery in risk aversion task  , and   is a vector of individual and socio-demographic 
characteristics. The parameter  , as a linear function of the characteristics in vector  . 
Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010) notes that the expected utility model can be 
                                                             
10 See Figure A.X in the appendix A or Harrison and Rutström (2008); Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
(2010) or any standard advanced econometrics textbook for a display of the normal and logistic cumulative 
density function (cdf). 
11 See footnote 10 
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extended to allow the core parameter    to be a linear function of observable characteristics of 
the individual or task. In this regard, we controls for the following independent variables: 
subjects’ age (in years) and it squared;  gender (female); household size (hhsize); a binary as 
to whether or not the household has children aged 0-17 years (children) i.e. the presence of 
children; mean educational attainment (matrics) i.e. Grade 12 or Standard 10; a binary as to 
whether or not the household monthly income is less than R2,000 (hhincome); employment 
status (unemployed); a binary as to whether or not the household received government grants 
(govt. grant); a binary as to whether or not the household experienced home damaged by fire 
(fire_exp); a binary as to whether or not the household/dwelling is located within a 70 meters 
radius from the main road (close_to_road); a binary as to whether or not the household has 
informal electricity connection (informal_elect); a binary as to whether or not the household 
uses paraffin for lighting, cooking and/or heating (paraffin); a binary as to whether or not the 
household is engaged in “most effort” against “least effort” fire prevention strategies12, 
referred to as “fires” and for the game frames or treatment i.e. mixed frame “mixed” and loss 
frame “loss”.   
Notice that in order to allow for behavioural errors in the sample13, an important extension of 
the model is done by incorporating the Fechner index,  , following Anderson, Harrison, Lau 
and Rutström (2010) such that equation (3) becomes: 
    
(       )
 ⁄         (3a) 
The Fechner index is due to Fechner (1966) and is an important error specification that was 
popularized by Hey and Orme (1994), among others. Accordingly, if       there is no 
                                                             
12 Essentially, this variable distinguish households as engaged in either “most effort” measures i.e. fire 
prevention strategies that need most effort, are most effective and costly, including building a home at least 3-5 
meters from the neighbours and making sure that the home has more than one exits against “least effort” 
measures i.e. fire prevention strategies that are less effective and least cost and pertain to households’ exposure 
to “risk” of fire from most probable causes or origins of fire (See Table A.III for the grouped fire prevention 
strategies categories in the appendices) 
13 It is natural to assume that subjects make errors in their choice, say due to carelessness, hurry, or insufficient 
motivation in the process of calculating the expected utilities. In fact, as Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström 
(2010)  notes that the notion of error is one that is already encountered in the form of the statistical assumption 
that the probability of choosing a lottery is not 1 when the    of that lottery exceeds the    of the other lottery. 
This assumption is clear in the use of a link function between the latent index     and the probability of picking 
one or other lottery; in the case of the normal CDF, this link function is  (     ) (see Anderson, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström, 2010).   
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behaviour error implying that specification (3a) essentially collapses to specification (3); if 
    (   ) then the difference in the expected utility of the two lotteries is increased 
(decreased), making the choice that was predicted when     more (less) likely (Anderson, 
Harrison, Lau & Rutström, 2010). 
Furthermore, the “contextual error” specification developed by Wilcox, 2008 and advocated 
by Harrison and Swarthout (2012) is incorporated into the model so that specification (3a) 
becomes: 
    ((       )  )           (3b) 
where   is a normalizing term which, for each lottery pair, is defined as the difference 
between the maximum and minimum utility over all lottery prizes in a particular lottery pair. 
This extension is incorporated into the probit specification equation (4) such that the 
conditional log-likelihood function specification (5) becomes: 
    (       )  ∑ *(   (   )   (    ))  (  (   (   ))   (     ))+  (5a) 
where the variables are as defined above. It should be noted that, as   is provided by the data, 
it is not a parameter that needs to be estimated. 
This experimental estimation is done using maximum likelihood method in Stata and the 
codes for which are cordially provided by Harrison (2008). In every case the standard errors 
are corrected for clustering at the individual level in order to account for the possibility that 







                                                             
14 As Harrison, Lau, and Rutström (2007) notes that the procedures for allowing for clustering allow 
heteroskedasticity between and within clusters, as well as autocorrelation within clusters. They are closely 
related to the “generalized estimating equations” approach to panel estimation in epidemiology and generalize 
the “robust standard errors” approach popular in econometrics (also see, Harrison & Rutström, 2009).  
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III. EXPERIMENT DESIGN & PROCEDURE 
This section provides an overview of the experiment design and procedure. For more details, 
the reader is referred to Brick and Visser (forthcoming) that share the dataset as the current 
study.  Whereas Brick and Visser focus on flooding and risk attitudes, this paper focuses on 
fire prevention and risk aversion among the urban informal dwellers in Cape Town. 
A. Experiment Design 
The experiment design employed in this study follows Harrison and Rutström (2009, 2008), 
and Hey and Orme (1994). This study employed the Random Lottery Pair design (RLP)15, 
which entails giving the subject an ordered array of binary lottery choices to make all at once. 
The RLP requires the subject to pick one of the lotteries on offer, and then the experimenter 
plays that lottery. More generally, the RLP instrument is typically used in conjunction with 
the random lottery payment procedure in which one choice is picked to be played out. The 
great advantage of the RLP instrument is that it is extremely easy to explain to subjects and 
the incentive compatibility of truthful responses apparent (Harrison & Rustrom, 2008).  
Following Hey and Orme (1994), subjects were asked to make direct preference choices over 
60 pair of lottery tasks in which the probabilities varied for four fixed monetary prizes16. 
Subjects could express direct preference for one lottery over the other. One of the pairs was 
chosen at random at the end of each session for pay-out for each subject, and the subjects’ 
preferences over that pair applied. In each lottery task, subjects choose between two lottery 
pairs (Option 1 or Option 2).17, 18 There are three (3) treatments: a gains-only treatment, a 
mixed treatment and a loss treatment. In the gain frame, there is no endowment and the 
lottery prizes are R0, R50, R100 and R150. In the loss frame, the lottery prizes are –R150, –
R100, –R50 and R0. In addition, experiment participants are provided with an initial per 
game endowment of R150 so that total payoffs are equalized across the treatments. In the 
                                                             
15 Harrison and Rutström (2008) provide a comprehensive review of the different elicitation procedures that 
have been used in empirical and theoretical studies. Readers are thus referred to this paper for a comprehensive 
review of elicitation procedure. 
16 Just for clarifications, all monetary terms are in South African Rands, denoted as R 
17 This is similar to the Holt and Orme (HO) instrument which provides a simple test for risk aversion using an 
RLP design. Each subject is presented with a choice between two lotteries; say option A and option B.  
18Subjects choose either Option 1 or Option 2 (no explicit indifference option was provided).  
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mixed frame, however, participants are provided with a R75 per game endowment and the 
payoffs are R75, –R25, R25 and –R75 (See, appendix B for an exhibit of the game frame and 
appendix E for the instructions).  
The probabilities of each prize vary with each lottery task (Table I). In the first lottery task of 
the gain frame19, if a participant chooses Option 1, s/he has a 13 percent chance of earning 
nothing, a 25 percent chance of earning R100 and a 62 percent chance of earning R150. 
Conversely, if he/she chooses Option 2, he/she is guaranteed R100. Thus, the expected payoff 
incentive to choose option 1 in lottery task 1 is R1820 (and the expected payoff incentives 
were equalized across treatments per lottery task). Notice that the expected payoff incentive 
varies across lottery tasks. For a risk-neutral person, we expect he/she to choose option 1 six 
times (i.e. lottery task 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9) before switching to option 2 (for the first 10 lottery 
tasks), regardless of the treatment.   
B. Procedures 
The experimental procedure used to capture data is similar to that reported by (Harrison & 
Rustrom, 2008; Anderson, Harrison, Lau & Rutström, 2010). The lottery probabilities were 
depicted as a “pie” (with colour codes) showing the probability of each prize, which were 
operationalized through the use of a spinning wheel. Given that this experiment was 
conducted in a sample with low levels of numeracy and education, great care was taken to 
make the lottery task as cognitively accessible as possible. While the actual probabilities 
associated with each lottery outcome are provided in the decision sheets, participants were 
able to supplement this metric by also looking at the “slices of the pie”21.   
 
                                                             
19The interpretation can be extended to other treatments, that is, the mixed and loss treatment.  
20 Notice that, for example, the expected payoff of option 1 in lottery task 1 is:          ( )      (   )  
    (   )       and           (guaranteed). Therefore, the expected payoff incentive to choose option 1 
over option 2 in lottery task 1 is R18. The expected payoffs were not provided in the instructions to subjects, just 
like in Holt and Orme (1994) procedure. 
21 See Appendix B 
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Table I: Lottery-Choice Decisions & Expected Payoff Difference 
(Per treatment) 
Option 1 Option 2 Expected Payoff 
Difference Gain  R 0 R 50 R 100 R 150 R 0 R 50 R 100 R 150 
Mixed  -R75 -R25 R25 R75 -R75 -R25 R25 R75 
Treatment 
Loss  -R150 -R100 -R50 R0 -R150 -R100 -R50 R0 
Lottery 
task Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 3 Pr. 4 Pr. 1 Pr. 2 Pr. 3 Pr. 4 Gains Mixed Loss 
1 0.13 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 18.0 18.0 18.0 
2 0.13 0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 18.0 18.0 18.0 
3 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.38 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.74 -5.0 -5.0 -5.0 
4 0.00 0.87 0.13 0.00 0.13 0.62 0.25 0.00 0.5 0.5 0.5 
5 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.75 0.25 0.00 0.00 7.0 7.0 7.0 
6 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.37 0.37 0.00 0.26 -14.0 -14.0 -14.0 
7 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.25 0.00 -6.5 -6.5 -6.5 
8 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 18.0 18.0 18.0 
9 0.37 0.26 0.37 0.00 0.25 0.62 0.13 0.00 6.0 6.0 6.0 
10 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.62 0.00 -24.5 -24.5 -24.5 
Adopted from Harrison and Rutström (2009), Hey and Orme (1994) 
 
After all lottery tasks were completed, two were selected at random for payment22. The “pies” 
for Option 1 and Option 2 of the selected lottery tasks were in turn placed on a spinning 
wheel. One of the participants would spin the wheel, ultimately determining the payoff for 
both Option 1 and Option 2 in each lottery task. There were three treatments (gain, mixed & 
loss) and each was conducted on separate days23.  
 
In addition to participating in the lottery task, each participant completed a survey 
questionnaire24 which captured the socio-demographic characteristics of subjects, including a 
                                                             
22 Lotteries were randomly selected by placing 60 pieces of paper – numbered 1 to 60 – into a bag. Once all 
decisions sheets were collected, 2 participants each drew a piece of paper out of the bag which determined which 
lottery tasks were to be played for real money (Brick & Visser, forthcoming). 
 
23 At each treatment, the same enumerator explained the instructions (see, appendix C for the instructions) in 
detail. A projector was used to display the lottery tasks while the enumerator went through the instructions 
(Brick & Visser, forthcoming). 
24 See the survey questionnaire in appendix D 
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range of questions around their experience of floods and fires and their flood and fire 
mitigation strategies. In terms of fire, specific questions were asked about subjects’ fire risks, 
fire experience and fire precautions or fire safety measures. 
 
In order to eliminate house money effects (as far as possible), in both the mixed and loss 
treatments the endowment was expressed as payment for completing a survey questionnaire. 
However, it was emphasised that any money earned throughout the course of the day would 
be added (i.e. gain and mixed frame) to this amount and any money lost (i.e. mixed and loss 
frame) while playing the lottery tasks. In addition to the endowment, participants in all 





The number of participants that were recruited25 from BM section in Khayelitsha, Cape Town 
was 174 (60 for treatment I: gains; 60 for treatment II: mixed; and 54 for treatment III: loss), 
each representing a household. Khayelitsha is an informal settlement in Cape Town, located 
on the Cape Flats, and is annually prone to natural disasters (such as floods) and fire26. The 
area is densely populated and according to the City of Cape Town 2011 census, about 55 
percent of the households live in informal dwelling.27 Subjects were randomly chosen from 
this informal settlement to represent the population that was affected by these disasters.  
Table II shows the mean characteristics of the sample – for the sample as a whole and for 
each treatment (gain, mixed and loss). On average, participants are 32 years old (with 
standard deviation of 9.88) and there is a considerable variation of age across the three 
treatments. The average age for treatment I (gain), treatment II (mixed), and treatment III 
(loss) respectively is about 35 years, 32 years, and 30 years.28 Approximately 60 percent of 
the respondents are females, although this varied across treatments. Females constitute about 
67 percent, 65 percent, and 48 percent of the sample in the three treatments (gains, mixed, and 
loss), respectively.  
For the entire sample, on average, about 37 percent of the households have children aged 0 to 
17 years old. About 58 percent of the households have adults aged 18 to 64 years old while 
only 5 percent of the households have elderly persons aged 65 years or over. However, the 
average (mean) household size for the entire sample is 5.20 (with standard deviation of 2.32). 
Educational attainment amongst subjects is relatively low. Subjects have, on average, 
obtained 12 years of education (Grade 12, Standard 10) (for the entire sample), although the 
mean level of education is higher in treatment III (loss) where participants are younger on 
average. Approximately, 2 percent of the sample has obtained some primary school education 
only and nearly 4 percent have completed their primary schooling (Grade 7). Just over 18 
                                                             
25 See Brick and Visser (forthcoming) for the field setting and recruitment details.  
26 See Figure A.III and A.IV in the Appendices for the map of Khayelitsha, Cape Town and an aerial view of 
BM Section, the study site. 
27The City of Cape Town - 2011 Census Suburb for Khayelitsha reported a population of 391 749 people 
(predominantly Black African (99 percent)); 118 809 households with 55 percent of the households living in 
informal dwelling (CCT, 2013). 
28 A kernel density distribution of age shows that age is almost normally distributed for the entire sample (See 
Figure A.V, Kernel density of distribution of age in appendix A) 
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percent have obtained some high school education (Grades 8-10), around 28 percent have 
passed grade 11 and approximately 39 percent have obtained a Grade 12 qualification.29  
Table II: Sample Statistics 









(n=174) (n=60) (n=60) (n=54)a 
Female (percent) 60.34 66.67 65.00 48.15 
Ageb 32.40 35.42 31.87 29.65 
 
(9.88) (9.74) (10.87) (7.95) 
Household Size 5.20 5.30 5.49 4.76 
 
(2.32) (2.11) (2.27) (2.55) 
Household Composition: 
    
 Proportion of children (0-17 yrs) 0.37 0.41 0.35 0.36 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.26) 
 Proportion of adults (18-64 yrs) 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.62 
 
(0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.26) 
 Proportion of elderly (65+ yrs) 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.02 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.05) 
Educational attainmentc 12.37 11.68 12.28 13.24 
 
(2.44) (2.44) (2.40) (2.24) 
Household Monthly Incomed (percent) 
(<R2,000) 54.02 61.67 45.00 55.56 
Unemployed (percent) 40.35 46.67 37.93 35.85 
Govt. grant recipient status (percent) 71.26 73.33 75.00 64.81 
Fire experience (percent) 34.48 31.67 40.00 31.48 
Informal electricity connection (percent) 28.16 18.33 26.67 40.74 
Use of paraffin (percent) 45.40 46.67 38.33 51.85 
Location of dwellings 
(percent of dwelling located <70 meters 
from main road) 
51.15 51.14 51.28 51.02 
Notes: 
(i) aSix (6) participants never showed up on the actual day of the experiment 
(ii) bA kernel density distribution of age shows that age is almost normally distributed for 
the entire sample (See Figure A.V, Kernel density of distribution of age in appendix A) 
(iii) cSee Figure A.VI in the appendix for the distribution of educational attainment 
(iv) dSee Figure A.VII in the appendix for the distribution of household monthly income 
per income bracket  
 
                                                             
29 See Figure A.VI in the appendix for the distribution of subjects’ educational attainment. 
24 
 
Household monthly income is relatively low. About 54 percent of the households earn less 
than R2, 000 per month30. This sample statistics is fairly consistent with official statistics. 
According to the City of Cape Town - 2011 Census Suburb for Khayelitsha, 41 percent of 
households living in informal settlement earn less than R800 per month. It is worth noting 
however that the quality of census data on household income is relatively poor as it is derived 
by adding together the individual incomes of all members of the household (CCT, 2013).  
Nearly 40 percent of the subjects in the entire sample are unemployed, and this varied across 
treatment with participants in treatment I (gains) having the highest unemployment rate at 
about 47 percent and those in treatment III (loss) the lowest unemployment rate at about 36 
percent. This is consistent with the official City of Cape Town – 2011 Census suburb for 
Khayelitsha, that report about 60 percent of the labour force (aged 15 to 64) being employed 
(CCT, 2013).  
In terms of uptake of government grants, approximately 70 percent of the households receive 
at least one government grant. Specifically, 16 percent of the households receive a pension, 
over 61 percent of the households receive a child care grant, and only 6 percent receive a 
disability grant. 
Nearly 35 percent of the participants reported having experienced damage from fires31, 32. 
Additionally, a large proportion of the sample engages in activities that pose fire risks. 
Specifically, about 29 percent of the sample had illegal/informal electricity connection. These 
present a serious fire hazards as illegal/informal electricity connection has been cited as the 
main cause of fires in homes. For instance, due to illegal electricity connection or “electricity 
tapping”, overloading of the electricity power system often leads to wires overheating, short 
circuits and insulation being ignited resulting in fires that spread rapidly. 
There is a considerable variation in the energy sources used for lighting, heating and cooking 
in South Africa. Most households in informal settlements rely largely on unsafe, unhealthy 
forms of energy such as candles, paraffin, coal and firewood, when they cannot afford to buy 
electricity to fulfil basic household energy needs particularly with respect to lighting, heating 
and cooking (SEA, 2014). Nearly 45 percent of this sample use paraffin for lighting, heating 
                                                             
30 See Figure A.VII in the appendix for the distribution of household monthly income per income bracket.  
31 See also Figure A.VIII in the appendix for the distribution of household experience with fire, use of paraffin 
for lighting, heating and cooking, and informal/illegal electricity connection 
32 It is worth noting however that all the subjects knew the risk of fires in the informal settlements 
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and cooking33. Paraffin is highly flammable, and poses serious fire risk when contaminated by 
water or other fuels (Schwebel & Swart, 2009). It has been cited as the main cause of severe 
burns, and paraffin stoves that are knocked over or explode are a major cause of injuries and 
fires in informal settlements.34 As such, local authorities recommend that households should 
always have a bucket of sand nearby when using a paraffin appliance and keep their stove on 
a flat surface, as a fire prevention strategy.  
Prevention of fires in view of exposure from possibilities of fires spreading from one dwelling 
to others due to the influence of street widths and openness (Bayliss, 1955) is the main 
challenge in fire prevention in informal settlements. Informal settlements are highly dense and 
often have narrow road, such that in case of emergency, it is difficult for emergency and 
rescue teams to get to the fire site35. This study tries to capture the distributional pattern of 
dwelling i.e. in terms of the distance of subjects’ dwelling from the main road.36 Almost half 
(i.e. 50 percent) of the household are located less than 70 meters from the main road and is 
evenly distributed across treatments.37, 38   
From what we infer above households may have very limited choice over several high risk 
factors such as their household’s physical location from access roads and may also be forced 
by necessity to make illegal/informal electricity connections or to use flammable substances, 
like paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking to meet their basic needs. We borrow Professor 
Amartya Sen’s concepts of functioning and capability. Sen’s concept of functioning relates to 
the things a person may value doing or being. Functionings are features of a person’s state of 
existence ranging from relatively elementary states (e.g. being adequately nourished), to 
                                                             
33 This statistics is consistent with regional statistics for Western Cape Province South Africa. According to the 
Western Cape Informal Settlements Status 2013 report, formal urban areas almost exclusively use electricity for 
lighting and cooking (96 percent) while informal urban settlements use candles and paraffin for lighting (25 
percent), cooking (26 percent) and heating (39 percent) (CCT, 2013).    
34 Follow the City of Cape Town link for more details: 
https://www.capetown.gov.za/EN/ENVIRONMENTALRESOURCEMANAGEMENT/TIPS/Pages/ParaffinSafe
tyTips.aspx  
35 Informal settlements, such as Khayelitsha in Cape Town, are densely populated and the roads are narrow and 
not tarred in many places. The obvious impact of this is on time it takes the emergency and rescue services to 
reach the dwelling. See Figure A.IV, an aerial photo of the study site – BM section of Khayelitsha, Cape Town 
in appendix A. 
36 The distance (in meters) of dwellings from the main road was estimated using GPS coordinates captured 
during the time of recruitment of subjects, with assistance from the Geomatics department of the University of 
Cape Town.  Note that this is the linear distance approximation of dwellings from the main road. However, we 
did not consider the distance of dwellings from un-gazetted informal settlement roads. See an aerial photo of the 
study site – BM section of Khayelitsha, Cape Town in appendix a. 
37 The average distance of dwellings from the main road is about 70 meters with most of the dwellings located 
within a 100 meters range  
38 See also Figure A.V in the appendix for the distribution of households from the main road, per treatment. 
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complex personal states and activities (e.g. participation and appearing without shame). The 
concept of capability relates to the ability of a person to achieve different combinations of 
functionings – the various combinations of valuable beings and doings that are within a 
person’s reach, reflecting the opportunity or freedom to choose a life that a person values 
(Sen, 1984). In this regard, we may deduce that households have capabilities that they can 
engage in to reduce the hazards of fires. Households may be able to engage in a range of fire 
prevention strategies over which they do have more direct choice or control. These include:  
- Building the home about 3-5 metres away from the neighbours; 
- Making sure that candles and lamps are extinguished before sleeping or leaving 
the home; 
- Making sure that the home has more than one exit; 
- Keeping matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of children;  
- Keeping the stove on a flat surface; and  
- Keeping a bucket of sand and a bucket of water for fire extinguishing39.  
These are low-cost local initiatives and individual-level strategies that can be designed to 
prevent fires or mitigate fires originating from homes over which households have a lot more 
direct control or choice. It is worth stating that there are other technologies designed to 
prevent fires or mitigate the risk of fires that include smoke alarms, detection and burner 
control, hood extinguishing systems, portable fire extinguishers, and home fire sprinklers. 
However, for the low-income highly dense urban informal settlements, such low-cost local 
initiatives and individual-level strategies (like the fire safety measures outlined above) can 
greatly mitigate the risk of fire.  
The above outlined fire prevention or fire safety measures are grouped into three (3) broad 
categories, depending on the level of effort (and/or effectiveness and cost) need to engage in 
such strategies40, as:  
(i) Do Nothing: this category captures all responses to subjects who reported that they 
do nothing to mitigate themselves from the risk of fire. 
(ii) Least effort measures: this category captures all responses to subjects who reported 
that they usually put out all candles and lamps before sleeping or leaving home; 
keeps matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of children; keep their stove on flat 
surface; and, keep a bucket of water and/or a bucket of sand close-by for fire 
                                                             
39 See footnote 7 
40 See Table A.III in appendix A for a summary of these fire prevention strategies categories. 
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extinguishing. These are fire prevention strategies for subjects’ exposure to “risk” of 
fire from most probable causes or origins of fire i.e. heating and lighting, house-
keeping and habits. It is worth noting that fires beginning with cooking appliances 
account for the largest shares of home structure fires and associated fire injuries in 
informal settlements. The leading causes of fires in informal settlements are probably 
from cooking (e.g. unattended cooking), heating, and human behaviours, such as 
substance abuse like alcohol and smoking. 
(iii) Most effort measures: this category captures all responses to subjects who reported 
that they have built their homes at least 3-5 meters apart from the neighbours; and 
that they make sure that their homes have more than one exit. Essentially, this fire 
prevention category captures individual “risk” at which the fire originates via 
building planning and construction. The occurrences of fire in informal settlements 
have been compounded by the fact that homes are typically small, low, with small 
window opening in many areas and frequently separated by narrow avenues. These 
homes are hurriedly and cheaply built, using vast quantities of wood in floor and roof 
constructed with materials which are widely available and least expensive, such as 
plastics, cardboard or iron sheets. 
 
The second column of Table III shows individual and grouped fire prevention strategies 
engaged in by all households while in the third and fourth column, the sample is sorted so as 
to show individual and grouped fire prevention strategies engaged in by households with 
previous fire experience and household without previous fire experience, respectively.  The 
difference in means for the two sub-samples i.e. household with previous fire experience and 
household without previous fire experience in terms of the individual and grouped fire 
prevention strategies is shown in the last column41. Further, the two-sample t-test for 
difference in means, assuming equal variances for the sub-samples, is performed. Essentially, 
we test the pairwise hypothesis that the mean difference is zero against its alternative i.e. to 
show that those with previous fire experience significantly engage in more fire prevention 
strategies than those without. 
Nearly 18 percent of the entire sample has done nothing to mitigate themselves from the risk 
of fire. About 73 percent of the entire sample is engaged in “least effort” fire prevention 
strategies with nearly 22 percent report putting out candles and lamps before sleeping or 
                                                             
41 See Table A.II and A.III in the appendix for fire experience and individual fire prevention strategies per 
treatment (gain, mixed, and loss) and fire experience and grouped fire prevention strategies, respectively. 
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leaving home, about 15 percent report keeping matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of 
children, 26 percent report keeping the stove on a flat surface, while the majority (37.90 
percent) report keeping a bucket of sand and a bucket of water for fire extinguishing as fire 
prevention measures. Approximately, 9 percent of the entire sample is engaged in “most 
effort” fire prevention strategies, of which nearly 45 percent report having built their homes at 
least 3-5 metres apart from the neighbours and about 55 percent report making sure that their 
home has more than one exit. 
The proportion of households that have done nothing to mitigate themselves from the risk of 
fire is significantly less for household with previous fire experience as their counterpart. This 
may not be surprising as households with previous fire experience may undertake more fire 
precautionary measures to reduce future occurrences of fires. The proportion of households 
engaged in “most effort” fire prevention strategies is significantly more for household with 
previous fire experience than for households without previous fire experience. Similarly, the 
proportion of households engaged in “least effort” fire prevention strategies is significantly 
more for household with previous fire experience than for household without previous fire 
experience42.  
                                                             
42 See Table A.II in the appendices for households’ fire experience and grouped fire prevention strategies (as 
described in Table A.III, in the appendices) 
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 Table III: Fire Experience & Fire Prevention Strategies 
(Figures are in Percentage) 












I. Do nothingb 18.39 5.00 25.44 -20.44* 
II. Least effort 72.99 85.00 66.67 18.33* 
 Put out all candles & lamps before 
sleeping or leaving home 
21.77 16.33 25.33 -9.00* 
 Keep matches, lighters and paraffin out 
of reach of children 
14.52 8.16 18.67 -10.51* 
 Keep stove on flat surface 25.81 28.57 24.00 4.57* 
 Keep a bucket of water and a bucket of 
sand close-by for fire extinguishing 
37.90 46.94 32.00 14.94* 
III. Most effort 8.62 10.00 7.89 2.11* 
 Built the home at least 3 metres apart 
from the neighbours 
44.64 60.87 33.33 27.54* 
 Made sure that the house has more than 
one exit 
55.36 39.13 66.67 -27.54* 
Notes 
(i) aDifferences in means is computed for the sub-samples: households with and without 
previous fire experiences.  
(ii) aThe two-sample t-test for difference in means, assuming equal variances for the sub-
samples, is performed between household with and without fire experience. Essentially, 
we test the pairwise hypothesis that the mean difference is zero against its alternative i.e. 
to show that those with previous experience make significantly more effort than those 
without. 
(iii) b“Do nothing” captures all responses to subjects who reported that they do nothing to 
mitigate themselves from the risk of fire. 







V. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
In this section, we presents the maximum likelihood estimates, assuming normal Fechner 
errors and taking into account the “contextual error” specification developed by Wilcox, 2008 
and advocated by Harrison and Swarthout (2012). We also discuss the results in relation to 
those found in similar previous studies. 
Table IV presents the results from the conditional log-likelihood function (equation 5a) of the 
expected utility specification, assuming constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Accordingly, 
if the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion,  , of the expected utility model is equal to 
zero (i.e.    ), greater than zero (i.e.     ) or positive, or less than zero (i.e.    ) or 
negative, it corresponds respectively to risk neutrality, to risk aversion, and to risk seeking. 
Notice that the regression coefficients are interpreted as the marginal effects of each variable 
as compared to the default case (Harrison, Lau & Rutström, 2007). The first panel (panel A) 
of Table IV shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the expected utility specification 
with Fechner index, assuming homogeneous preferences. The coefficient    is estimated to be 
-0.0698, with a standard error of 0.0906. The coefficient is however not statistically 
significant different from zero implying risk neutrality.  
Figure II (a) displays the distribution of predicted risk attitudes from the EUT model 
estimated, assuming constant relative risk aversion. As mentioned above, for the CRRA 
specification, a value of 0 denotes risk neutrality behaviour, negative values indicate risk 
seeking behaviour, and positive values indicate risk aversion. Thus, it can easily be seen from 
the chart (Figure II (a)) that the average of this distribution is centred around 0 (with the point 
estimate          ) implying risk neutrality in CRRA terms. This result is noteworthy 
because experimental evidence from other studies indicates modest degrees of risk aversion. 
In particular Anderson, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2010), who utilized data on 
experimental procedure reported by Harrison and Rutström (2009, 2008) on 158 students of 
the University of Central Florida, found a coefficient of constant relative risk aversion of 
0.771, indicating risk aversion. Other studies, such as Harrison, Humphrey and Verschoor 
(2010) in Ethiopia, India and Uganda; Brick, Visser and Burns (2012) in South Africa; 
Galarza (2009) in Peru; Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2007) in Denmark, also found evidence 
of moderate risk aversion. There is, however, considerable variation in the distribution of risk 
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attitudes for the three treatments: gain, mixed and loss. With the exception of the gain frame 
(Figure II (b)), the loss and mixed frame shows risk seeking behaviour of subjects43.  
The second panel (panel B) of Table IV reports the relative risk estimates assuming that 
choices are explained by the expected utility theory specification (specification 5a) with 
Fechner index, and making such risk estimate be a linear function of subjects’ characteristics 
and subjects’ use of fire safety measures44. There are five (5) main results that can be drawn 
from this panel. First, the results indicate moderate degree of risk seeking, i.e. the predicted   
at average values is -0.1334, with standard error of 0.4991. This means that an individual with 
the average characteristics and fire safety measures (Table IV) will exhibit a moderate degree 
of risk seeking, however, not statistically significant different from zero. Second, there is 
evidence of a large degree of randomness in choices, as indicated by the Fechner index, μ = -
0.1630 with standard error of 0.0151, for homogeneous preferences and μ = -0.1520 with 
standard error of 0.0263, for heterogeneous preferences. This result is not surprising as our 
sample is composed of individuals with typically low levels of schooling and as such a large 
proportion of them are bound to make mistakes in their lottery choices45.  Several studies that 
incorporates the normal Fechner errors in their analysis have found it to be statistically 
significant, implying evidence of random errors when subjects calculate the values of the 
lotteries (e.g. Galarza (2009) in Peru; Harrison, Lau & Rutström (2007) in Denmark; Brick, 
Visser, & Burns (2012) in South Africa).  
Third, subjects in the mixed and loss treatments are less risk averse, as shown by the 
decreasingly negative coefficients of the variables mixed frame and loss frame, with the effect 
being statistically significant (             ). Clearly, Figures II (c) and II (d) point out 
the left-ward skewness from zero in the distribution of risk attitudes for the mixed frame and 
loss frame, respectively. It is striking to note that recent experimental evidence from the 
laboratory (e.g. Holt & Laury, 2002; Hey & Orme, 1994) and the field (e.g. Galarza, 2009; 
                                                             
43See Figures II (b), (c), and (d) below which displays the kernel density of observed risk attitudes per treatment 
(gain, mixed and loss). 
44 Additional regression results are appended in Table A.VI, where we systematically introduce different 
covariates to illustrate the effects of socio-demographic characteristics and fire experience & fire prevention 
strategies on risk attitudes. 
45 The large random errors or mistakes can be attributed to several factors, including the lack of attention to or 
understanding of game instructions, carelessness, hurry, or insufficient motivation in the process of calculating 
the expected utilities.  
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Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2007; Bosch-Domenech & Silvestre, 1999) suggests in general 
that subjects exhibit risk aversion over the gain domain. 
Fourthly, risk aversion varies with key demographic variables, namely gender, age, 
educational attainment, the presence of children, household income, and employment status. 
We find a significant effect from age, with risk aversion increasing with each year in age of 
subjects (        )46 and risk aversion increases with educational attainment. This finding 
is consistent with the findings of Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (2010) who find that subjects 
who are both older and more educated are more risk averse in Vietnam. Similarly, Harrison, 
Lau and Rutström (2007) finds the age and education effects on risk attitudes, with subjects 
who begin or complete vocational training or higher education in Denmark being 
significantly more risk averse than those with less while risk aversion decreases with age, 
particularly after age 40. However, we do not statistical significant effects of educational 
attainment and other demographic variables, including the presence of children47 in the 
household, on risk aversion contrary to expectation. For instance, we hypothesized that risk 
aversion amongst subjects with children at home is more than those without children at home. 
It is noteworthy however that empirical evidence on the relationship between risk aversion 
and other characteristics such as gender, age, education level, the presence of children at 
home, and employment status is mixed.   
                                                             
46 Interestingly, age remains statistically significant even when subjects’ previous experience with fire and 
distance of dwelling from the main road are not controlled for in regression (2) and (3) of Table A.VI in the 
appendices (See Table A.VI in the appendices).  
47  Interestingly, the presence of children at home indicates less risk aversion, and becomes statistically  
significant when distance of dwelling from the main road, use of paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking, and 
informal/illegal electricity connection variables are not controlled for in regression (6) and (7) of Table BVI in 
the appendices (See Table B.VI in the appendices). 
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Table IV: Maximum Likelihood Estimation - Expected Utility Theory 







  Constant -0.0698 -1.7550* 
  
(0.0906) (0.9630) 
Mixed  Mixed frame . -0.5650*** 
  
. (0.1760) 
Loss  Loss frame . -1.3080** 
  
. (0.6080) 
Female  Female . 0.3390 
  
. (0.2150) 
Age  Age (in years) . 0.0842* 
  
. (0.0485) 
Agesq  Age squared . -0.0009 
  
. (0.0006) 
Children  Presence of children . -0.2460 
  
. (0.1770) 
Matrics  Grade 12 (or Standard 10) . 0.0084 
  
. (0.1370) 





Unemployed  Unemployed . 0.1750 
  
. (0.1650) 
Fire_exp Fire experience . -0.1120 
  
. (0.1850) 










Informal_elect Informal electricity connection . -0.1750 
  
. (0.1810) 
Paraffin  Use of paraffin for lighting, 




 Constant -0.1630*** -0.1520*** 
    (0.0151) (0.0263) 
Notes 
   (i) Sample size, n 10,394 7,290 
(ii) Log pseudo-likelihood -6889.15 -4606.94 
(iii) Wald Chi-square (df) . 30.92 (14) 
(iv) Predicted r (at average values) . -0.3167 





Fifth, the results indicates that subjects engaged in fire safety measures that need „most effort‟ (i.e. 
fire prevention measures that are most effective and costly) are more risk averse as compared to 
subjects engaged in fire safety measures that need „least effort‟ (i.e. fire prevention measures that 
are least effective and less cost), as shown by an increasing positive coefficient on the variable 
fires48 by 0.2210, with standard error of 0.1060. This coefficient is statistically significant at 
            . The “most effort” measures are defined as those fire prevention measures that 
need more effort, are most effective and costly and are typically aimed at reducing households 
exposure to fire risks from probable causes49. The fire prevention measures included in this 
category are: building of homes at least 3-5 meters apart from the neighbours, and making sure 
that subjects’ homes have more than one exit. Essentially, this fire prevention category captures 
individual “risk” at which the fire originates via building planning and construction.  
On the other hand, the “least effort” measures are those fire prevention measures that need least 
effort, are least effective and less cost, and include: putting out all candles and lamps before 
sleeping or leaving home, keeping matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of children, keeping 
of stove on the flat surface and keeping a bucket of water and/or a bucket of sand close-by for fire 
extinguishing. These are fire prevention strategies for subjects’ exposure to “risk” of fire from 
most probable causes or origins of fire i.e. heating and lighting, house-keeping and habits. Most 
fires in the informal settlement begins with cooking appliances which account for the largest 
shares of home structure fires and associated fire injuries (IAFC, 2013). It is common knowledge 
that the leading causes of fires in informal settlements are probably from cooking (e.g. unattended 
cooking), heating, and human behaviours, such as substance abuse like alcohol and smoking. 
                                                             
48 Note that a binary variable that assess households engaging in “most effort” versus “least effort” measures was 
constructed and used in regression analysis i.e. maximum likelihood estimation reported in Table III and Table A.VI, 
in the appendices. In essence, subjects who have done nothing to mitigate themselves from the risk of fires are not 
included in this analysis. This task reduced the sample size from 10,394 choices to 7,290 choices. However, the aim is 
to test the hypothesis as to whether or not subjects engaged in “most effort” are more risk averse as subjects engaged 
in “least effort”. 
49 See Bayliss (1955), Crosby (1905) for a comprehensive review of causes of fires in homes and Raphela (2011) on 
the thesis of the impact of stack fires on poor households in informal settlements. 
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-2 -1 0 1
Prediction
CRRA: r>0 is risk averse, r=0 is risk neutral, and r<0 is risk loving
(Estimated with n=174 subjects, making 10, 394 choices)










-.5 0 .5 1
Prediction
CRRA: r>0 is risk averse, r=0 is risk neutral, and r<0 is risk loving
(Estimated with n=174 subjects, making 10, 394 choices)










-1 -.5 0 .5
Prediction
CRRA: r>0 is risk averse, r=0 is risk neutral, and r<0 is risk loving
(Estimated with n=174 subjects, making 10, 394 choices)











-2 -1.5 -1 -.5
Prediction
CRRA: r>0 is risk averse, r=0 is risk neutral, and r<0 is risk loving
(Estimated with n=174 subjects, making 10, 394 choices)
Figure II (d): Distribution of risk attitudes under EUT (Loss frame)
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We also estimated risk preferences using only individual-level fire prevention strategies 
variables in a separate regression (appended as Table A.V), where we show that certain 
individual-level fire prevention measures that are within the means of the households to effect, 
such as keeping matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of children, is correlated with risk 
aversion, but measures, such as building of homes at least 3-5 meters from the neighbours, and 
keeping of stove on the flat surface, does not seem to be within the choice set of low-income 
informal dwellers due to constraints, such as poverty and inequality. 
Contrary to expectation, distance from the main road, informal electricity connection, and the 
use of paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking are not correlated with risk aversion, indicating 
that irrespective of the risk profiles of decision makers, low-income households are often forced 
to make choices that increase their exposure to fire hazards.  It is common practice that with no 
electricity connection (and even with unreliable electricity supply), households are forced to rely 
on unsafe and unhealthy forms of energy for lighting, heating and cooking, such as the use of 
flammable substances like paraffin, which poses high fire hazards. It is also worth noting that 
with informal/illegal electricity connection, which is the common practice especially in informal 
settlements, households are exposed to high fire hazards as informal electricity connection has 
been cited as one of the leading causes of fires.  
We explore the relationship of informal electricity connection (and the use of paraffin for 
lighting, heating and cooking) with several socio-demographic and household previous fire 
experience factors in Table V. The logistic regression analysis is performed at two levels: for the 
full sample and a sub-sample of subjects with previous fire experience. The aim of this task is to 
show the extent to which socio-demographic and household previous experience with fires is 
correlated with informal electricity connection (and the use of paraffin for lighting, heating and 
cooking)50.  
The literature shows that illegal/informal electricity or “electricity tapping” are mostly explained 
as the urban shantytown dwellers’ (informal settlers’) response to non-affordable prices of 
electricity. Mimmi and Ecer (2010) who studied the incidence and determinants of illegality in 
the context of low-income urban informal dwellers in Brazil found that the probability of urban 
                                                             
50 It should be noted here that this is not an explicit study on the determinant of households engagement in the use of 
paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking or illegal/informal electricity connection but rather we try to assess the 
extent to which socio-demographic and household previous experience with fires is correlated with these factors.  
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informal dwellers engaging in such illegal behaviours is explained not only by low income, but 
by a combination of concurring factors, including sub-standard energy provision and equipment, 
inefficient or incorrect use of domestic electric appliances and running an informal in-house 
businesses. Our findings seems to suggests that informal electricity connection is associated with 
educational attainment, household income, and household previous fire experience, here 
statistically significant at 1 percent (Table V). Interestingly, low-income households (or poor 
households) with previous fire experience are more likely to have illegal/informal electricity 
connection, and also subjects with low educational attainment (i.e. less than Grade 12 or 
Standard 10) are more likely to have illegal/informal electricity connection. On the other hand, 
households with previous fire experience and have children at home are less likely to have 
illegal/informal electricity connection while the probability of female engaging in 
illegal/informal electricity connection is less than their male counterparts. 
Poor households living in informal settlements face a range of chronic everyday risks associated 
with marginal living conditions and poor service delivery (Pharoah, 2009). Inadequate service 
delivery increases both people’s exposure and vulnerability to hazards, including fire hazards. 
For instance, with no electricity connection, households are forced to rely on unsafe and 
unhealthy forms of energy for lighting, heating and cooking, such as the use of flammable 
substances like paraffin, which poses high fire hazards. However, even with electricity, 
households may continue to rely on traditional sources of energy for lighting, heating and 
cooking, such as the use of paraffin stoves.  Our results indicates that low-income households 
with previous fire experience are more likely to use paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking, 
and that subjects who are unemployed are more likely to use paraffin for lighting, heating and 
cooking. This result is not surprising as Kehrer, Kuhn, Lemay and Wells (2008) notes that most 




Table V: Logistic Regression Estimations 
(Standard errors in parenthesis) 
VARIABLES 
A. Informal electricity 
connection 













Female  -0.2650*** -0.0942 -0.3140*** -0.6470*** 
 
(0.0471) (0.0865) (0.0443) (0.0907) 
Age  0.1820*** 0.0850* 0.0614*** -0.0276 
 
(0.0187) (0.0483) (0.0119) (0.0429) 
Agesq  -0.0028*** -0.0015** -0.0005*** 2.47e-05 
 
(0.0003) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0006) 
Children  -0.1720*** -0.1210 0.1450*** 0.8680*** 
 
(0.0564) (0.1040) (0.0537) (0.1130) 
Educ.  0.0222** 0.1530*** 0.1150*** 0.3380*** 
 
(0.0109) (0.0229) (0.0100) (0.0286) 
HHincome 0.0222 0.9790*** 0.4110*** 0.3170*** 
 
(0.0469) (0.0838) (0.0437) (0.0868) 
Unemployed  -0.0648 0.0038 0.8170*** 1.5020*** 
 
(0.0478) (0.0776) (0.0433) (0.0834) 
Fire_experience 0.2700*** . -0.4230*** . 
 
(0.0474) . (0.0456) . 
Distance  0.0008 0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0006 
 
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Constant -3.7780*** -4.1220*** -3.3800*** -4.7850*** 
 
(0.3640) (0.8370) (0.2700) (0.8260) 
LR chi-square (df) 342.77 (9) 221.28 (8) 867.11 (9) 699.96 (8) 
Pseudo R2 0.0280 0.0488 0.0614 0.1477 
Log-likelihood -5953.00 -2157.37 -6627.95 -2019.02 
Definition of variables: 
„Age‟ - subjects’ age (in years) and it squared;  gender (female); a binary as to whether 
or not the household had children aged 0-17 years (children) i.e. the presence of 
children; educational attainment (educ) i.e. less than Grade 12 or Standard 10; a binary 
as to whether or not the household monthly income is less than R2,000 (hhincome); 
employment status (unemployed); a binary as to whether or not the household 
experienced home damaged by fire (fire_experience); distance of dwelling from the 
main road (distance); a binary as to whether or not the household uses paraffin for 




heating and cooking51. It is striking to note that although electricity used for cooking and 
heating maybe fairly inexpensive, it is sometimes unreliable and this often force people in 
informal settlement to rely on use of paraffin for heating and cooking despite the dangers it 
poses to fires. Subjects with previous fire experience and low educational attainment are 
more likely to use paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking (Table V), and the probability of 
households with previous fire experience and have children at home engaging in the use of 
paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking is more than their counterparts52.  
It is worth mentioning that perception of the risk posed by fire in the home varies according 
to people’s subjective assessment of their vulnerability, level of care and protection, the 
potentially fatal consequences as well as, affective features such as the perceived level of 
control over risk and its predictability  (CLG, 2008). There appeared to be a reasonable level 
of connotation between people’s self-appraisal of these factors and their ability to judge the 
factors that place them at greater risk of fire. This concern may be associated with people 
taking precautions and adopting coping strategies that lead them to feel they can manage the 
risk and therefore are at less risk (CLG, 2008). In this paper, we tests the hypothesis that risk 
averse individuals will take precautionary measures in as far as possible to mitigate the risk 
of fire to their household. Our findings seem to suggest that certain low-cost individual-level 
fire prevention measures that are within the means of the households to effect (e.g. making 
sure that matches, lighters and paraffin are kept out of reach of children) is correlated with 
risk aversion.  
However, for fire prevention efforts to be effective, the education of the public in fire 
precautions and prevention needs the resources of modern advertising and high-powered 
publicity (Bayliss, 1955). Public safety education can be an effective tool for affecting fire 
safety related to human behaviours, and a robust public education campaign can raise 
awareness about the dangers associated with fire. However, several factors may limit the 
                                                             
51 Most residents in informal settlements struggle to access electricity as it is provided only to those residents 
who have an official address registered with the municipality and those who do not have access are forced to 
buy electricity (via “electricity tapping”) from their neighbours. Burning paraffin fuel for cooking and heating is 
common throughout the informal settlement. However, when electricity is not available people are often faced 
to use paraffin as an effective yet slightly more expensive energy source, despite the dangers it poses to fires 
(Kehrer, Kuhn, Lemay, & Wells, 2008).   
52 See footnote 47 
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effectiveness of public safety education with regard to fire safety campaigns, some of which 
are embodied in human behaviours and institutional constraints.    
It suffice to note that while smaller less costly behavioural changes are easy to implement and 
can reduce risk of fire enormously, there are more substantial risks or “structural risks” which 
falls outside the means of low-income households53 and therefore outside their realm of their 
influence. A number of high risk factors fall outside the means of a low-income household 
(e.g. illegal/informal electricity connections or “electricity tapping”) that can increase 
household fire risk. Several studies have shown that the greater occurrence of fires in 
informal settlements is due to high density nature of informal settlements (e.g. a study by 
DiMP (2002) in Joe Slovo informal settlement in Langa, Cape Town). The local authorities 
have a „big‟ role to facilitate the reduction in fire risk (such as by re-gridding of informal 
settlements; promoting the use of safer and healthy energy sources) that can drastically 
reduce household fire risks in informal settlements.  
Certain behavioural changes are within the means of households and advertising, campaigns 
and education can help in reducing fire hazards in the informal settlements. Indeed, 
community safety campaigns, say through door-to-door fire safety education, can enhance 
community preparedness of fire disasters and enhance their resilience to such situations.  
 
 
                                                             
53 For example, most fires in several different informal settlements are often linked to behavioural factors such 
as alcohol abuse, smoking and domestic violence (Pharoah, 2009). 
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, the current paper has attempted to provide experimental evidence of fire 
prevention and risk aversion among urban informal dwellers in Cape Town, South Africa, 
using subjects’ choices over lotteries with real monetary prizes. The empirical analysis is 
performed within the expected utility theory specification, assuming constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) defined over the lottery prize. Overall, this study has shown that subjects 
are risk neutral and this finding is not consistent with experimental evidence on risk aversion 
from other studies (e.g. Binswanger, 1980; Brick, Visser, & Burns, 2012; Anderson, 
Harrison, Lau & Rutström, 2010). However, risk attitudes are found to vary with socio-
demographic characteristics and subjects’ use of fire safety measures. We tests the hypothesis 
that risk averse individuals will take precautionary measures in as far as possible to mitigate 
the risk of fire to their household. Our findings shows that individual-level fire prevention 
measures that are within the means of the households to effect, such as making sure that 
matches, lighters and paraffin are kept out of reach of children, is significantly correlated 
with risk aversion, but measures, such as building of homes at least 3-5 meters from the 
neighbours, does not seem to be within the choice set of low-income informal dwellers.  
We also group the fire prevention measures into two (2) broad categories, namely “most 
effort” and “least effort” measures depending on the effort and cost involved in each 
measure and constructed a binary variable that captures households engaging in these 
measures. Our results indicate that subjects who engage in fire prevention/fire safety 
strategies that require the „most effort‟ (that are most effective and costly) are significantly 
more risk averse relative to subjects engaging in fire safety measures that need „least effort‟. 
In terms of demographic variables, there is a significant effect from age, with risk aversion 
increasing with each year in age of subjects, and risk aversion increases with educational 
attainment. Contrary to expectation, distance from the main road, informal electricity 
connection, and the use of paraffin for lighting, heating and cooking are not correlated with 
risk aversion, indicating that irrespective of the risk profiles of decision makers, low-income 
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Appendix A: Other Information 
Figure A.I: Informal Fire Statistics – Fire incidents in informal settlements in Cape 
Town, 1999 to 2012 
 
Source: City of Cape Town, 2013 
 
Figure A.II: Informal Fire Statistics – Number of Structures Affected, 2005 to 2013 
 
Source: City of Cape Town, 2013 
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Selected Previous Related Studies 
Table A.I: Summary of Empirical Studies on Risk Aversion 
Study  Sample - Study area & 
experimental design 
Finding (s)  Comment (s) 
Holt, Charles A 




both the hypothetical 
and actual payoffs) 
 
 
This paper presented estimates of a hybrid “power-expo” utility 
function that exhibits: (1) increasing relative risk aversion, which 
captures the effects of payoff scale on the frequency of safe 
choices, and (2) decreasing aboute risk aversion, which avoids 
absurd amounts of risk aversion for high-stakes gambles. 
Behaviour across all treatments conformed closely to the 
predictions of their model 
Holt and Laury (2002) assess risk aversion 
and incentive effects under a simple lottery-
choice experiment (involving both the 
hypothetical and actual payoffs) that elicit risk 
aversion over a wide range of payoffs (i.e. 
both low – and high-money payoffs).  
 
Binswanger, 
Hans P (1980) 
 240 households in 
India  
 Used two 
approaches: (i) 
interview method, & 
(ii) experimental 
gambling approach 
 Experimental measures indicates that, at high payoffs levels, 
virtually all individuals were moderately risk averse with little 
variation according to personal characteristics 
 Wealth tends to reduce risk aversion slightly, but its effect 
was slightly statistically significant 
 This study aimed at determining whether 
or not differences in behaviour between 
farmers of different wealth levels are the 
consequence of different attitudes toward 
risk  
 Payoffs varied from very low levels to 
levels exceeding the monthly income of 
unskilled rural labourers 
Brick et al 
(2010) 
 Large sample of 
small-scale fishers 
(555 subjects)  
 Used two 
approaches: (i) 
interview method, & 
(ii) experimental 
gambling approach 
 Participants exhibited moderate risk aversion and that risk 
attitudes vary with certain socio-demographic variables, that 
is, females were found to be more risk averse than their male 
counterparts; quota holders were more risk loving 
 Using logistic regression analysis, this study found that a 
greater degree of risk aversion translated into a reduction in 
the odds of non-compliance with fisheries regulation 
 This study found that female fishers and 
female fisher with fishing rights were more 
likely to comply with fisheries regulation  
 These finding shows important 
implications for the characterization of risk 
attitudes in fisheries policy applications 
and for the management of marine 
resources 
Liu, Elaine M 
(2008) 
Survey and field 
experiment to elicit the 
risk preferences: of 320 
Chinese farmers: 
Expected utility and 
 This study found that farmers who are more risk averse or 
more loss averse adopt Bt cotton 
 Farmers who overweight small probabilities adopt Bt cotton 
earlier 
This paper examined the role of individual 
risk attitudes in the decision to adopt a new 
form of agricultural biotechnology in China 
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2002 living standard 
measurement survey 
plus field experiment 
 Mean village income was related to risk and time preferences 
 Household income is correlated with patience (lower interest 
rate) but not with risk preference 
 
 
This study results suggest people are present 






with 253 subjects aged 
19 to 75 years old 
Results indicate that the average Dane is risk averse. Risk 
attitudes vary significantly with respect to several important 
socio-demographic variables such as age and education. 
However, the sex effect on risk attitude was not significant   
In this study investigated risk attitude were 
estimated for various individuals differentiated 
by socio-demographic characteristics  
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                 Figure A.III: Map of Khayelitsha, Cape Town 
 
Figure A.III: Total number of informal dwelling fires incidents by suburb, 1990 - 2005 
Source: DiMP (2006) 
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Figure A.IV: Study Site: BM Section, Khayelitsha, Cape Town 
 
             Figure A.IV: Aerial view – Khayelitsha, Cape Town 




Figure A.V: Kernel density of distribution of age 
            























































































































































































































Figure A.VIII: Household's self-reported experiences 





























Figure A.IX: Distance of dwellings from the main road
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Figure A.X: Normal and Logistic Cumulative Density Function 
 
Source: Harrison & Rustrom (2008) 
Figure A.X is the standard cumulative normal and logistic distribution function.  
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Table A.II: Fire Experience & Individual Fire Prevention Strategies 







(n=10,440) (n=3,600) (n=3,600) (n=3,240) 
Proportion of household who experienced fire damages 34.68 31.67 40.00 32.08 
Panel A: All subjects (Full sample) 
Fire protection strategies (percent): 
    Do nothing 18.39 15.00 20.00 20.37 
Built the home at least 3 metres apart from the neighbours 21.84 20.00 26.67 18.52 
Put out all candles & lamps before sleeping or leaving home 45.40 45.00 40.00 51.85 
Made sure that the house has more than one exit 17.82 20.00 20.00 12.96 
Keep matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of children 39.66 41.67 43.33 33.33 
Keep stove on flat surface 32.76 40.00 25.00 33.33 
Keep a bucket of water and a bucket of sand close-by for fire 
extinguishing 27.01 31.67 20.00 29.63 
 








 (n=3,600) (n=1,140) (n=1,440) (n=1,020) 
Fire protection strategies (percent):     
Do nothing 5.00 10.53 4.17 0.00 
Built the home at least 3 metres apart from the neighbours 31.67 31.58 41.67 17.65 
Put out all candles & lamps before sleeping or leaving home 51.67 31.58 66.67 52.94 
Made sure that the house has more than one exit 15.00 15.79 20.83 5.88 
Keep matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of children 43.33 36.84 50.00 41.18 
Keep stove on flat surface 41.67 31.58 41.67 52.94 
Keep a bucket of water and a bucket of sand close-by for fire 
extinguishing 38.33 47.37 29.17 41.18 
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Table A.III: Fire Prevention Strategies Categories 
          Category Activities/Fire prevention strategies 
(i) Do nothing Do nothing 
(ii)  Most efforta (Individual “risk” at which 
the fire originates: Planning & 
construction) 
 Built their home at least 3 meters from 
their neighbours 
 Homes have more than 1 exit 
(v) Least efforta (Exposure to risk of fire 
from most probable causes/origins: 
Heating & Lighting, House-keeping & 
Habits) 
 Put out all candles and lamps before 
sleeping or leaving home 
 Keep matches, lighters and paraffin out 
of reach of children  
 Keep a bucket of water and/or sand 
close-by for fire extinguishing 
 Keep their stove on a flat surface 
 Do not perform any “most effort” 
activities 
Note: aEssentially, we are assuming that these two categories are mutually exclusive. We 
acknowledge that there are some overlap between these activities listed in each category, for 













Table A.IV: Fire Experience & Grouped Fire Prevention Strategies 










(n=10,440) (n=3,600) (n=3,600) (n=3,240) 
Fire experiencea 34.68 31.67 40.00 32.08 
Panel A: All households (Full sample) 
Fire protection strategies (percent) 
       Do nothing 18.39 15.00 20.00 20.37 
    Most effort strategies  8.62 6.67 13.33 5.56 
    Less effort strategies     72.99 78.33 66.67 74.07 










(n=3,600) (n=1,140) (n=1,440) (n=1,020) 
    Do nothing 5.00 10.53 4.17 0.00 
    Most effort strategies  10.00 10.53 12.50 5.88 
    Less effort strategies 85.00 78.95 83.33 94.12 
Note:  
(i) “Do nothing” captures all responses to subjects who reported that they do nothing to mitigate 
themselves from the risk of fire; “most effort measures” this fire prevention category captures 
individual “risk” at which the fire originates via planning and construction (see Table II.A); 
and “less effort measures” this category captures fire prevention strategies that pertains to 
subjects’ exposure to “risk” of fire from most probable causes or origins of fire i.e. heating 
and lighting, house-keeping and habits (see Table II.A). 














Table A.V: Maximum Likelihood Estimation – EUT 







  Constant -0.0698 -0.3320 
  
(0.0906) (0.5520) 
Mixed  Mixed frame . -0.6060*** 
  
. (0.1730) 
Loss  Loss frame . -1.0460** 
  
. (0.4320) 
Female  Female . -0.0382 
  
. (0.1480) 
Age  Age (in years) . 0.0547* 
  
. (0.0322) 
Agesq  Age squared . -0.0006 
  
. (0.0004) 
HHsize  Household size . 0.0118 
  
. (0.0342) 
Children  Presence of children . -0.2510 
  
. (0.1740) 








Unemployed  Unemployed . 0.0784 
  
. (0.1340) 
Govt_grant Government grants . -0.1010 
  
. (0.1330) 
Fire_exp Fire experience . -0.0587 
  
. (0.1370) 

























Stove_flat_surface Keep stove on flat surface . -0.1380 
  
. (0.1680) 





Matches_lighters Keep matches, lighters and paraffin 









 Constant -0.1630*** -0.1520*** 
    (0.0151) (0.0239) 
(i) Sample size, n 10,394 10,334 
(ii) Log pseudo-likelihood -6889.15 -6639.42 
(iii) Wald Chi-square (df) . 51.80 (22) 
(iv) Predicted    (at average values) . -0.1683 

































-2 -1 0 1
Prediction
CRRA: r>0 is risk averse, r=0 is risk neutral, and r<0 is risk loving
(Estimated with n=174 subjects, making 10, 394 choices)
Figure A.XI: Distribution of risk attitudes under EUT
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Table A.VI: Maximum Likelihood Estimation - Expected Utility Theory 
  
A.Homogeneous 
Preferences B. Heterogeneous Preferences 
Variable(s) Description Constant  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  Constant -0.0698 -1.7550* -0.1690 -1.7640* -1.7680* -1.5850* -1.5890* -1.6080* 
  
(0.0906) (0.9630) (0.5740) (0.9760) (0.9770) (0.9210) (0.9420) (0.9310) 
Mixed  Mixed frame . -0.5650*** -0.5280*** -0.5890*** -0.5900*** -0.5870*** -0.5910*** -0.5750*** 
  
. (0.1760) (0.1430) (0.1770) (0.1770) (0.1670) (0.1720) (0.1540) 
Loss  Loss frame . -1.3080** -1.0500*** -1.3610** -1.3620** -1.2940** -1.3350** -1.3020** 
  
. (0.6080) (0.3630) (0.6500) (0.6510) (0.5660) (0.5920) (0.5150) 
Female  Female . 0.3390 -0.0113 0.3640* 0.3640* 0.3500* 0.3560* 0.3410* 
  
. (0.2150) (0.1330) (0.2080) (0.2080) (0.2000) (0.2050) (0.1890) 
Age  Age (in years) . 0.0842* 0.0393 0.0808* 0.0807* 0.0721 0.0718 0.0727 
  
. (0.0485) (0.0316) (0.0468) (0.0467) (0.0450) (0.0462) (0.0455) 
Agesq  Age squared . -0.0009 -0.0004 -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0007 
  
. (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) 
Children  Presence of children . -0.2460 -0.1540 -0.2590 -0.2580 -0.2850 -0.2930* -0.2870* 
  
. (0.1770) (0.1500) (0.1810) (0.1800) (0.1740) (0.1720) (0.1690) 
Matrics  Grade 12 (or 
Standard 10) 
. 0.0084 0.0783 -0.0071 -0.0072 0.0198 0.0206 0.0169 
 
. (0.1370) (0.1160) (0.1390) (0.1390) (0.1300) (0.1310) (0.1310) 
HHincome Household monthly 
income (>R2,000) 
. 0.0049 -0.0012 -0.0219 -0.0223 -0.0205 -0.0455 . 
 
. (0.1750) (0.1220) (0.1580) (0.1580) (0.1540) (0.1560) . 
Unemployed  Unemployed . 0.1750 0.0439 0.1810 0.1800 0.1780 0.1570 0.1450 
  
. (0.1650) (0.1220) (0.1690) (0.1690) (0.1630) (0.1600) (0.1540) 
Fire_exp Fire experience . -0.1120 -0.1620 . . . . . 
  
. (0.1850) (0.1400) . . . . . 
Fires Fire prevention 
strategies 
. 0.2210** . 0.2430** 0.2430** 0.2230** 0.2190** 0.2130** 
 
. (0.1060) . (0.1050) (0.1050) (0.0892) (0.0901) (0.0838) 
Close_to_road Distance of dwelling 
from main road 
. -0.0082 0.0231 -0.0108 . . . . 
 
. (0.0536) (0.0424) (0.0546) . . . . 
Informal_elect Informal electricity 
connection 
. -0.1750 -0.1970 -0.1990 -0.2000 . . . 
 
. (0.1810) (0.1570) (0.1810) (0.1810) . . . 
Paraffin  Use of paraffin for 
lighting, heating & 
cooking 
. -0.0915 -0.1660 -0.0666 -0.0667 -0.0795 . . 
 
. (0.1490) (0.1190) (0.1490) (0.1490) (0.1420) . . 
 Constant -0.1630*** -0.1520*** -0.1500*** -0.1550*** -0.1550*** -0.1490*** -0.1510*** -0.1490*** 
    (0.0151) (0.0263) (0.0182) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0232) (0.0237) (0.0217) 
Notes 
         (i) Sample Size, n 10,394 7,290 10,394 7,290 7,290 7,290 7,290 7,290 
(ii) Log-pseudo likelihood . -4606.94 -6699.09 -4608.30 -4608.32 -4611.66 -4612.43 -4612.68 
(iii) Wald Chi-square (df) . 30.92 (14) 48.23 (13) 30.16 (13) 30.11 (12) 35.97 (11) 34.71 (10) 36.76 (9) 
(iv) Predicted   (at average values) . -0.3167 -0.1517 -0.3355 -0.3357 -0.2834 -0.2953 -0.2830 
(v) Standard errors in parentheses; ***Significant at 1%; **Significant at 5%; *Significant at 10% 
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Appendix B: Game Frame (Illustrations) 
Illustration D.I: Gain Frame [Game 1] 
   
Illustration D.II: Mixed Frame [Game 1] 
  




Appendix C: Instructions (Mixed Frame) 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Good morning! Thank you for coming. My name is [NAME], and I am a researcher with the 
University of Cape Town. These are my colleagues [NAMES]. We have invited you here to 
play some financial games.  
You will be paid for participating in this workshop today. For being here today you will earn 
R50. This is your money to take home.  
We are going to start by filling out a short survey. You will earn money for filling in this 
survey. You will earn R150 for filling in this survey.  
Now this is very important. When we play the financial games, you can earn more money 
or you can lose money. Any money that you earn will be added to this R150. Any money that 
you lose will be deducted from this R150.  
How much money you earn or lose depends on the decisions you make during the games. 
That is why it is very important you understand the rules of the games, which I am going to 
explain to you as we go along.  
The income you earn from today will be paid to you at the end of the day in the form of a 
cash cheque which you can cash at any branch of ABSA Bank. 
You play these games as individuals, not in groups. So please don’t talk to anyone while we 
are playing the games. If you have ANY questions at any stage you can just raise your hand 
and someone will come and answer your question privately.   
Participation in these sessions is voluntary. If you decide not to take part, you may leave at 
any moment, even after you have started playing – but then you will not earn any money. If 
you prefer to stay we ask that you sign the form that our assistants are bringing around right 
now.  
[HAND OUT THE CONSENT FORMS]   
This form says that you understand participation in these games is voluntary and that you can 
leave whenever you want to. But if you do leave before we have finished playing all the 
games, you won’t receive any money.  
Is everyone finished signing the forms? Ok, someone is going to come around and collect the 







Ok. As I said, we are going to start by filling out a short survey… 
 
Remember, you will earn R150 for filling in this survey.  
 
[Hand out the surveys]  
 





OK, let’s move on to the financial games.  
 
Remember, you can earn extra money or lose money by playing these games. Any money 
that you earn will be added to the R150 that you have earned for filling in the survey. 
Any money that you lose will be deducted from the R150 that you have earned for filling 
in the survey.  
 
I am now going to explain the rules of the game. 
 





This poster is a large version of the sheet of paper that is in front of you.  
 
In this game, you must choose between 2 options: Option 1 and Option 2 [REFER TO 
POSTER].  
 
You must show on the sheet in front of you, whether you choose Option 1 or Option 2.  
 
Now, for both of these options, for Option 1 and Option 2, the amount of money you earn or 
lose depends on these spinning wheels. And, it depends on what colour the arrow lands on. 
 
On this spinning wheel we have option 1. And on this spinning wheel we have option 2. 
 
As you can see, in option 1, the arrow can land on blue, green or purple [rotate the spinning 
wheel while you talk] 
 
As you can see, in option 2, the arrow can only land on green because the whole area is green 
[rotate the spinning wheel while you talk] 




[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75 – that is why we have written –R75 in the blue area 
on the sheet [point to where it says –R75].  
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25 – that is why it says R25 inside the green area 
[point to where it says R25] 
If the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75 – that is why it says R75 inside the purple area 
[point to where it says R75].  
 
These blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how much 
money you would earn or lose if the arrow lands on blue, green or purple:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75 
If the arrow lands on red you lose R25 – but there is no red in this game 
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25,  
And if the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75.  
 
There are two ways you can think about Option 1.  
 
The first way is to use the percentages that are shown in this row [point]. With Option 1, 
there is a 13 percent chance that you will lose R75. There is a 25 percent chance that you will 
earn R25. There is a 62 percent chance that you will earn R75.  
 
The other way to think about Option 1 is to look at the different sizes of the coloured areas. 
This is the way that we are going to explain the games to you. 
 
The purple area is VERY big. So if you choose Option 1, there is a very big chance that the 
arrow will land on purple and you will earn R75. As you can see, the purple area is much 
bigger than the green and blue areas, so there is a bigger chance of the arrow landing on 
purple than there is of it landing on green or blue.  
 
But the green area is still quite big – even though it is smaller than the purple area. So there is 
still a chance that the arrow could land on green and that you could earn R25. The green area 
is slightly bigger than the blue area. So at least you know there is a slightly bigger chance of 
the arrow landing on green than there is of the arrow landing on blue. So you have a slightly 
bigger chance of earning R25 than you do of losing R75.  
 
But even though the blue area is small – it is still there. So there is a small chance the arrow 
could land on blue and you could lose R75.  
 
Now let’s look at Option 2.  
 
With option 2, the whole circle is green.  
 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25 – that is why we have written R25 in the green area 




These blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how much 
money you would earn or lose if the arrow lands on green:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75 – but there is no blue in this game 
If the arrow lands on red you lose R25 – but there is no red in this game 
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25  
And if the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75 – but there is no purple in this game 
 
So the arrow can only land on green. That means with Option 2 you are sure to earn R25.  
 
So now, you have to decide if you want to choose Option 2 and know that you will earn R25 
for sure, or if you want to choose Option 1 – where there is a big chance you will earn R75 
but a small chance you will lose R75.  
 
Let’s do an example. Let’s pretend that I am the type of person that wants to pick Option 1. 
Then I would show this by making a tick next to Option 1 [make a tick next to option 1]. 
Now that I have chosen Option 1, we spin the wheel so that I can see how much money I 
would lose. [Spin the wheel]. Ok, so the arrow has landed on [blue, green, purple] which 
means that I would have [lost R75, earned R25, earned R75].  
 
GAME 2 
Ok, let’s look at the second game. Once again, you must show on the sheet in front of you, 
whether you choose Option 1 or Option 2.  
 
Now, for both of these options, for Option 1 and Option 2, the amount of money you earn or 
lose depends on these spinning wheels. And, it depends on what colour the arrow lands on. 
 
On this spinning wheel we have option 1. And on this spinning wheel we have option 2. 
 
As you can see, in option 1, the arrow can land on red, blue or green 
[rotate the spinning wheel while you talk] 
 
As you can see, in option 2, the arrow can only land on red because the whole area is red 
[rotate the spinning wheel while you talk] 
 
Let’s start with Option 1.  
 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75 – that is why it says –R75 inside the blue area [point 
to where it says –R75].  
If the arrow lands on red, you lose R25 – that is why it says –R25 inside the red area [point to 
where it says –R25].  
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25 – that is why it says R25 inside the green area 




Remember, these blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how 
much money you would earn or lose if the arrow lands on blue, red or green:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75  
If the arrow lands on red you lose R25  
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25  
And if the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75 – but there is no purple in this game 
The green area is a bit bigger than the red area and MUCH bigger than the blue area. So this 
means that if you choose Option 1, there is a bigger chance of the arrow landing on green and 
of you earning R25 than there is of the arrow landing on red or blue.  
 
But the red area is still quite big. So there is still a big chance of the arrow landing on red and 
of you losing R25. 
 
Even though the blue area is very small, there is still a small chance that the arrow could land 
on blue and then you could lose R75.  
 
Now let’s look at Option 2.  
 
With option 2, the whole circle is red.  
 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on red, you lose R25 – that is why we have written –R25 in the red area on 
the sheet [point to where it says –R25].  
 
Remember, these blocks [point to the row of coloured blocks on the poster] also tell you how 
much money you would earn or lose if the arrow lands on red:  
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75 – but there is no blue in this game  
If the arrow lands on red you lose R25  
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25 – but there is no green in this game  
And if the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75 – but there is no purple in this game 
 
So the arrow can only land on red. That means with Option 2 you are sure to lose R25.  
 
So now, you have to decide if you want to choose Option 2 and lose R25 for sure, or if you 
want to choose Option 1 and maybe earn R75. But remember, with Option 1, there is still a 
small chance of you losing R75.  
 
Let’s do an example. Let’s pretend that I am the type of person that wants to pick Option 2. 
Then I would show this by making a tick next to Option 2. I know with Option 2 that I will 
lose R25 for sure so there is no need to spin the wheel. But let’s spin it anyway [spin the 
wheel]. The arrow landed on red and I lose R25.  
GAME 3 
Ok, let’s look at the third game. Once again, you must show on the sheet in front of you, 




On this spinning wheel we have option 1. And on this spinning wheel we have option 2. 
 
As you can see, in option 1, the arrow can land on green or purple [rotate the spinning wheel 
while you talk] 
 
As you can see, in option 2, the arrow can only land on purple, green or blue [rotate the 
spinning wheel while you talk] 
Let’s start with Option 1.  
 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25 – that is why it says R25 inside the green area 
[point to where it says R25] 
If the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75 – that is why it says R75 inside the purple area 
[point to where it says R75].  
 
The green is quite a bit bigger than the purple, so if you choose this option, there is a bigger 
chance of you earning R25 than there is of you earning R75. But the purple area is still quite 
big – so there is still a large chance of you earning R75. The worst you can do in this option 
is to earn R25. 
 
Let’s look at Option 2.  
 
[Point to the poster] 
If the arrow lands on purple, you earn R75 – that is why it says R75 inside the purple area 
[point to where it says R75].  
If the arrow lands on green, you earn R25 – that is why it says R25 inside the green area 
[point to where it says R25] 
If the arrow lands on blue, you lose R75 – that is why it says –R75 inside the blue area [point 
to where it says –R75] 
 
The purple area is very large. So if you choose this option, there is a very large chance that 
the arrow will land on purple and that you will earn R75. You can see the purple area is much 
larger than the blue and green areas. 
 
The green area is quite small so there is a small chance the arrow will land on green and you 
will earn R25.  
 
The blue area is quite small, so there is also a small chance the arrow will land on blue and 
you will lose R75.   
 
 
So now, you have to decide if you want to choose Option 1 – where the worst you can do is 
earn R25, or if you want to choose Option 2, where there is a big chance you will earn R75 




Let’s do an example. Let’s pretend that I am the type of person that wants to pick Option 2. 
Then I would show this by making a tick next to Option 2. Now that I have chosen Option 2, 
we spin the wheel so that I can see how much money I would earn. [Spin the wheel]. Ok, so 
the arrow has landed on [blue, green, purple] which means that I would have [lost R75, 
earned R25, earned R75]. 
 
[Conclude:] 
Ok, are there any questions so far? 
Ok, soon I am going to ask you to go through the booklet yourself. And on each page, I want 
you to decide whether you would like to play Option 1 or Option 2.  
Before you do that I want to explain one last thing: 
 
In this booklet there are 60 games. You are going to fill in the booklet for all 60 games. But 
we won’t have time to play all 60 games. So at the end of the day, we will choose 2 games to 
play for money.  
 
But we don’t know which of these 60 games we will be playing for money.  
 
I have here 60 pieces of paper – numbered 1-60. I am going to put these pieces of paper in 
this bag. At the end of the day, 2 of you will each pull a piece of paper out the bag.  
 
Whichever numbers are pulled out the bag – those are the games we will play.  
 
So if number 1 is pulled out the bag, we will play game 1 for money, if number 20 is pulled 
out the bag, we will play game 20 for money. Let’s do a demonstration [pull a number out of 
the bag]… so, because we don’t know which of the 60 games we will be playing for real 
money, it is important to act as if every game is being played for real money. 
 
Ok, now you can go through the booklet yourself. And on each page, I want you to decide 
whether you would like to play Option 1 or Option 2.  
Remember that any money that you earn will be added to the R150 that you have earned for 
filling out the survey and any money that you lose will be deducted from the R150 that you 
have earned for filling out the survey.  
When everyone is finished, we will use these numbered pieces of paper to decide which 2 






Appendix D: Survey Questionnaire 
 
Experiment number: _____________ 
 
Please note that you are free to leave out any questions that you prefer not 




1. Age: __________________________________ 
2. Date of Birth: __________________________ 
3. Gender:  
 [Tick one option only] 




4. How well can you read in your home language: 
[Tick one option only] 
 I cannot read 
 Not well 
 Fair 
 Very well 









5. What is the highest level of education that you have completed: 
[Tick one option only] 
 No schooling 
 Sub A 
 Sub B 
 Standard 1 
 Standard 2 
 Standard 3 
 Standard 4 
 Standard 5 
 Standard 6 
 Standard 7 
 Standard 8 
 Standard 9 
 Standard 10 (Matric certificate) 
 NTC 1 
 NTC 2 
 NTC 3 
 Certificate or diploma with less than Standard 10 (Matric certificate) 
 Certificate or diploma with Standard 10 (Matric certificate) 
 Bachelors Degree 
 Higher Degree (Honours, Masters) 












Here, you should include all those people who sleep and eat in the same household as you on 
a regular basis 
 
6. How many people (including you) live in your home? _______________________ 
7. What is your relationship to the person that is the head of the household?  
[Tick one option only] 














8. How many people living in the house are between: 
(a) 1 – 17 years: _________________ 
(b) 18 – 64 years: ________________ 
(c) 65 years and older: ____________ 
9. How many people living in your home have regular employment? 
_____________________ 






11. What is your monthly HOUSEHOLD income in a typical month?  
(This is the TOTAL income from EVERYONE living in the household) 


















 More than R15000 per month 














12. What is your monthly household expenditure in a typical month? 
(This is the TOTAL expenditure from EVERYONE living in the household) 





























INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT 
13. (a) Are you employed on a full-time basis? 
 Yes 
 No 
(b) What is your monthly salary from this job? 
 R________________ 
 I am not employed on a full-time basis 
14. (a) Are you employed on a part-time basis? 
 Yes 
 No 
(b) What is your monthly salary from this job? 
 R________________ 
 I am not employed on a part-time basis 
15. (a) Are you self-employed? (You work for yourself and not for an employer) 
 Yes 
 No 
(b) What is your monthly salary from this job? 
 R________________ 














16. What is YOUR monthly income in a typical month EXCLUDING 
GOVERNMENT GRANTS? 













 More than R10000 per month 
17. Are you unemployed? 
 Yes 
 No 
18. Are you the main breadwinner in your household? 
 Yes    
 No   
19. Are you able to make financial decisions for your household? 
 Yes 
 No   
 
GOVERNMENT GRANTS 






21. If yes, what does your household receive this money for? How much does your 
household receive each month? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 Pension: R_______________ 
 Child Care Grant: R_____________ 
 Disability Grant: R_____________ 
 No one in the household receives a government grant 
 
FLOODING 
22. How often do you experience flooding in or around your dwelling?  
[Tick one option only] 
 Every year during the rainy season 
 Every second year 
 Every third year 
 Not for the past 4 years  
 Not for the past 5 years  
 Not for more than 5 years 
 I have never experienced flooding 
23. How do you experience flooding? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have never experienced flooding 
 Water coming up through the ground 
 Water coming in through the roof 
24. When there is a flood, how are the contents of your home affected? 
[Tick only one option] 
 I have never experienced flooding 
 The contents of my home are usually not badly damaged 
 Some of the contents of my home are damaged 





25. What have you done to reduce the risk of flooding?  
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have not done anything to reduce the risk of flooding 
 I make sure that my floor is not below ground level 
 I use pallets to raise my home above ground level  
 I use stilts to raise my home above ground level  
 I use bags of sand to raise my home above ground level  
 I put plastic sheeting on my roof  
 I put plastic sheeting on my floor  
 I raise one side of my roof  
 I perform general maintenance on my roof before the start of the rainy season 
 I have moved to another area where the risk of flooding is lower 
 I have dug trenches/channels around my home 
 I regularly make sure that the drains/trenches around my home are not blocked 
 I am waiting for the City of Cape Town to move me to another area 
 I am waiting for the City of Cape Town to give me formal housing 
26. When there is a flood, do you KNOW who to report the flood event to (for 
example to a community leader or to the City of Cape Town)? 
 I have never experienced flooding, so have not had to report a flood event 
 Yes, I know who to report the flood event to 
 No, I don’t know who to report the flood event to 
27. Do you ALWAYS report the flood event to someone (for example a community 
leader or to the City of Cape Town)? 
 I have never experienced flooding, so have not had to report a flood event 
 Yes, I always report the flood event 
 I sometimes report the flood event 







28. What is life like for you after a flood?  
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have never experienced flooding 
 My home has been damaged 
 The property in my home has been damaged 
 The floor of my home is wet or underwater 
 The roads around my home become wet and muddy and it is very difficult for 
people to drive into or out of the area 
 The roads around my home become wet and muddy and it is difficult for me to get 
to the outside toilets 
 People (especially children) get sick from standing pools of dirty flood water 
 There are electricity shortages 
29. Have you ever stayed in an emergency shelter (for example a community hall) 
after a flood event?  
 I have never experienced flooding 
 Yes 
 No, I didn’t want to leave my belongings because they might have got stolen 
30. Do you think that some people settle in areas that are very prone to flooding on 
purpose, so that they will be given formal housing quicker? 
 Yes 
 No 
31. Rubbish that is thrown into drains/trenches sometimes increases the risk of 
flooding. How often do you throw your rubbish into drains/trenches? 
 Never 
 Sometimes 






32. Rubbish that is thrown into drains/trenches sometimes increases the risk of 




 Very often 
33. Rubbish that is thrown into drains/trenches sometimes increases the risk of 




34. Rubbish that is thrown into drains/trenches sometimes increases the risk of 
flooding. As part of a community initiative to keep the drains/trenches clear, 
would you report people who you see throwing rubbish into the drains/trenches? 
The people you report would be given a fine. 
 I would not participate in a community initiative like this 
 I would participate, but I would not report someone for throwing rubbish in the 
drains/trenches 




35. How many times has your home been damaged by fire? 
 My home has never been damaged by fire 
 My home has been damaged __________ times by fire 








37. Does your household have an informal electricity connection? 
 Yes 
 No 
 Prefer not to answer 
38. Does your household use paraffin for cooking and heat? 
 Yes 
 No 
39. What have you done to reduce the risk of a fire and protect yourself during a 
fire?  
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have not done anything to reduce the risk of a fire 
 I have built my home at least 3 meters apart from my neighbors’ 
 I put out all candles and lamps before I go to sleep or before I leave my home  
 I have made sure that my house has more than one exit 
 I don’t smoke in bed 
 I keep matches, lighters and paraffin out of reach of my children 
 I keep my stove on a flat surface 




40. The City of Cape Town has tried to educate people about how to protect 
themselves from floods and fires (for example by handing out brochures). Are 









41. The City of Cape Town has suggested that to protect yourself against floods, you 
should raise your floor above ground level, keep drains unblocked and dig 
channels around your home. Which of these suggestions are you aware of? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I am not aware of any of these suggestions 
 Raising my floor above ground level 
 Not throwing rubbish in the drains and keeping them unblocked 
 Digging channels around my home 
42. The City of Cape Town has suggested that to protect yourself against floods, you 
should raise your floor above ground level, keep drains unblocked and dig 
channels around your home. Have you as a result of this taken any of the actions 
listed below to protect your home against floods? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have raised my floor above ground level 
 I don’t throw rubbish in the drains and try to keep them unblocked 
 I have dug channels around my home 
 I have not taken any of these actions 
43. The City of Cape Town has suggested that protect yourself against fire, you 
should make sure your home is 3meters away from your neighbor, keep stoves 
on a flat surface and keep and keep a bucket of water and sand close by. Which 
of these suggestions are you aware of? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I am not aware of any of these suggestions 
 Making sure my home is 3 meters away from my neighbour 
 Keeping my stove on a flat surface 
 Keeping a bucket of water close by 






44. The City of Cape Town has suggested that protect yourself against fire, you 
should make sure your home is 3 meters away from your neighbor, keep stoves 
on a flat surface and keep and keep a bucket of water and sand close by. Have 
you as a result of this taken any of the actions listed below to protect your home 
against the outbreak of fire? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have made sure that my home is 3 meters away from my neighbour 
 I keep my stove on a flat surface 
 I keep a bucket of water close by 
 I keep a bucket of sand close by 
 I have not taken any of these actions 
 
SANITATION 
45. Which toilets do you use? 
 Individual toilets within the house 
 Communal toilets outside the house 
46. How often is the rubbish/refuse usually collected? 
 Never 
 Once a week 
 Twice a week  
 Once a month 
 Twice a month 
47. How often is the rubbish/refuse usually collected during the rainy season? 
 Never 
 Once a week 
 Twice a week  
 Once a month 







48. Do you have a bank account? 
 Yes 
 No 
49. If you don’t have a bank account, why not?  
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I do have a bank account 
 I have no money  
 Banks are too far away 
 The bank charges are too high 
 I don’t have the right documents to get a bank account (FICA) 
 I prefer to belong to a stokvel 
50. Do you belong to a stokvel? 
 Yes 
 No 
51. If you do not belong to a stokvel, why not? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I do belong to a stokvel 
 I save my money in a bank or other financial institution 
 I have no money to save 
 There is no stokvel available for me to join 
 I don’t trust people to be honest 











52. If you do belong to a stokvel, how often do you make payments into the stokvel? 
[Tick one option only] 
 I don’t belong to a stokvel 
 Weekly 
 Every two weeks 
 Monthly 
 6 times a year 
 4 times a year 
 3 times a year 
 2 times a year 
 1 time a year 
53. If you do belong to a stokvel, how much do you pay into the Stokvel each time? 
 I don’t belong to a stokvel 
 I pay into the stokvel: R_____________________ 
 
CREDIT 
54. Have you ever applied for a loan from a bank or any other financial institution? 
 Yes 
 No 
55. If yes, you have applied for a loan, did the bank give you the loan? 












56. If you have never applied for a loan from a bank or financial institution, why 
have you not?  
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I have applied for a loan 
 I do not like to borrow money from anyone 
 I prefer to borrow money from family and friends 
 I do not know how to apply for a loan 
 A loan is too expensive and difficult to pay back 
 I did not think I would be given a loan so I never applied for one 
 I have not needed to take out a loan 
57. Do you personally have any of the loans mentioned below 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 Home loan 
 Personal loan  
 Study loan 
 Vehicle finance 
 Credit card 
 Store card (for example: Edgars, Clicks, Foschini) 
 Loan from a friend or family member 
 I have none of the loans mentioned above 
 
INSURANCE 
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59. (a) Has your property ever been damaged in a flood or fire?  
 Yes 
 No 
(b) If yes, would it have helped you if your property had been insured?  
 My property has never been damaged by a flood or fire 
 Yes, insurance would have helped 
 No, insurance would not have helped 
60. If an affordable household insurance product was available today, would you 
consider buying it?  
 Yes 
 No 
61. Do you think buying insurance COULD BE a useful way to protect yourself 
against the risk that a negative event (like a fire or flood) might happen? 
 Yes, insurance could be very useful 
 No, I don’t think insurance would be very useful 
 I don’t know  
62. Have you ever had an insurance policy? 
 Yes 
 No 
63. If yes (you have had an insurance policy), what type of insurance policy was/is it? 
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I do not have an insurance policy 
 Crop insurance 
 Life insurance 
 Funeral policy 
 Medical insurance 
 Disability insurance 
 Homeowners insurance 





64. Which of these insurance policies do you still have?  
[You can tick as many options as you like] 
 I do not have an insurance policy 
 Crop insurance 
 Life insurance 
 Funeral policy 
 Medical insurance 
 Disability insurance 
 Homeowners insurance 
 Vehicle insurance 
65. If you have never bought insurance OR you ONLY have a funeral/burial policy, 
what is the reason for this? 
 I have never thought of buying insurance 
 I don’t really understand how buying insurance will help me 
 I have thought about buying insurance, but don’t know how to buy it 
 I have thought about buying insurance, but find that buying insurance is too 
complicated and difficult 
 I have thought about buying insurance, but it is too expensive 
 I do not want to buy insurance 
 Insurance companies will not sell insurance to a poor person like me 
 I have bought insurance 
66. (a) Would you join a stokvel where you saved money every month in case a 
negative event like a fire or flood happened? 
 Yes, definitely 
 Yes, possibly 
 No 








67. What type of person are you? 
[Tick one box only] 
 A person who often takes risks 
 A person who sometimes takes risks 
 A person who never takes risks 
68. How often do you buy lottery tickets (lotto or powerball for example)? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 I never buy lottery tickets 
69. How often do you play Fafi (iChina)? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 








70. How often do you play card/dice games for money? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 I never play card/dice games for money 
71. How often do you bet on animals (for example horse racing, dog racing etc)? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 
 I never bet on animals 
72. How often do you go to the casino? 
 Every day 
 Once a week 
 Twice a month 
 Once a month 
 Every two months 
 Four times a year 
 Twice a year 
 Once a year 




73. How do you feel about your life as a whole right now? 




             Very satisfied 
74. I you compare your life now to your life ten years ago, are you happier, the same 
or less happy with life? 
 Happier 
 The same 
 Less happy 
 
Thank you for completing the survey!
 
 
